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For some time the international community has been keenly interested 
in the foreign uses to which America puts its military. The nature of these 
uses has traditionally been affected by the manner in which the Constitu-
tion divides the war powers between the President and Congress. This 
allocation of war-peace authority, in tum, is the product of a number of 
influences, among them the intentions of the Framers and Ratifiers for the 
text which they drafted and approved. Their war-power debates, as we 
shall see, have heavy international overtones. 
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These debates have not been neglected, especially during America's re-
cent involvement in Indochina. Why another plunge into the war-power 
understandings of 1787 -88? In part, it is useful to approach them without 
the distraction unavoidable when the country is at war. More important, 
it is helpful to present in unusual detail the basic data on which 
conclusions about the Framers and Ratifiers' intentions rest. Armed with 
these data, it becomes possible for the reader to cast an informed and 
appropriately cold eye on pronouncements about what the Constitutional 
Fathers had in mind- including pronouncements below. 
I. THE FRAMERS AND RATIFIERS: THRESHOLD CONSIDERATIONS 
A. Enigmatic Intentions 
We begin with the reality that our grasp of the Framers and Ratifiers' 
intentions is none too firm. Five factors contribute to uncertainty about 
what they meant regarding congressional-executive control over war and 
peace. 
1. Fragmentary Record of Debate at the Constitutional Conventions 
When executive and congressional prerogatives clashed in the Steel Sei-
zure Case, Mr. Justice Jackson lamented the 
poverty of really useful and unambiguous authority applicable to 
concrete problems of executive power .... Just what our fore-
fathers did envision, or would have envisioned had they foreseen 
modern conditions must be divined from materials almost as 
enigmatic as the dreams Joseph was called upon to interpret for 
Pharaoh.' 
The situation is not that grim, but available records are impoverished. 
The Framers had an official secretary, William Jackson, but he re-
stricted himself largely to recording motions and votes. Further, his notes 
were "carelessly kept," and though his "statement of questions is probably 
accurate in most cases, . . . the determination of those questions and in 
particular the votes upon them should be accepted somewhat tenta-
tively."2 The Framers debated in secret, and Jackson's Journal remained 
undisclosed, first in the hands of George Washington and then in the 
Department of State, until it was published by order of Congress in 1819 
1. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 634 (1952) (concurring opinion 
of Jackson, J.). 
2. 1 M. FARRAND, RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at xiii-xiv (1911) 
[hereinafter cited as FARRAND]. 
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following the deaths of most of the Convention delegates.3 At that point, 
of course, it was essentially beyond verification or correction. 
In subsequent years, other accounts of the Framers' Philadelphia pro-
ceedings were published, most important the notes of James Madison in 
1840. But Madison as an old man had dubiously revised his account after 
the appearance of the Journal.4 His attempt to reconstruct events of more 
than thirty years before was necessarily clouded by the passage of time. 
Similarly, Charles Pinckney, attempting in 1819 to produce a copy of the 
plan that he had presented the Convention, could not remember which of 
several papers in his hands was the correct version.5 
Even when the available accounts of the Philadelphia proceedings are 
mustered, their overlapping discussion comes to very little for a convention 
that met steadily for almost four months. The standard compilation of the 
debates runs to less than 1300 pages. G The verbatim transcript of a pro-
ceeding of similar length today could easily reach twenty times that vol-
ume. Records of most of the state ratifying conventions are even more 
modest than those of Philadelphia.7 
2. Confusion Inherent in the Process 
Though attendance varied, a total of fifty-five men participated in the 
four months of deliberations in Philadelphia, and many more took part in 
the state ratifying conventions.8 Divergent positions had to be compro-
mised during the drafting of the Constitution, and compromise on one 
provision did not prevent efforts to reassert more extreme positions in later 
provisions. Thus, interpretation of specific language varied among dele-
gates. Moreover, because the Philadelphia Convention met in secret and 
its participants said little about its deliberations during ratification, dele-
3. See text at note 164 infra. 
4. Madison changed his notes in places to correspond with the questionable records of 
Jackson and Robert Yates. 1 FARRAND xvi-xvix. 
5. As Pinckney wrote John Quincy Adams, who was readying the Journal for publication, 
"at the distance of nearly thirty two Y cars it is impossible for me now to say which of the 4 
or 5 draughts I have was the one but enclosed I send you the one I believe was it." 3 FARRA..,"D 
595 (Letter of Dec. 30, 1818). 
6. The debates, redundantly described by different men, appear in the first two volumes 
of FARRAND, covering respectively 606 and 667 pages. 
7. See 2-4 J. ELuOT, DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE Co~'VEJI.IIONS os ntE Aoomos OF nlE 
FEDERAL CoNSTITtmON (1816) [hereinafter cited as Ewar). These records, first compiled in 
1830, range from a 663-page account of the Virginia debates to a 17-page fragment on the 
Connecticut proceedings. 
8. Attendance at the Philadelphia Convention averaged forty delegates. 3 FARRA..,"D 5!!6 n.2. 
Over 1,000 delegates attended the state ratifying conventions, Massachusetts' convention 
being the largest v.ith 364 Ratifiers and Delaware's the smallest with only 30. See C. W ~. 
THE MAKING OF THE CoNsnnmoN 819-20 (1928). 
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gates to the state conventions were largely unaware of the previously ex-
pressed views of the Framers. Even those Framers who were also Ratifiers, 
and who chose to tell their colleagues of the Philadelphia debates, did not 
always recall them with precision. Under the circumstances, it is not likely 
that a majority, much less all, of those who voted in the federal and state 
conventions for the Constitution's war-power provisions held a finely 
drawn, common "intent" about their meaning. 
3. Deliberate Ambiguity 
Evidence of several sorts suggest that the Framers may have drafted the 
Constitution with a measure of deliberate ambiguity. First, any constitu-
tional scheme hinged on separation of powers and on checks and balances 
necessarily allocates competing powers with vaguely defined frontiers 
among the various branches of govemment.9 Second, apparent on the face 
of the Constitution is a drafting technique that eschewed detail for terse 
statement and left much to be assumed for "[c]onstitution-makers, in 
that day at least, did not regard themselves as framers of detailed codes. 
To them the statement of the bare principle was sufficient .... " 10 
Third, the Constitutional Fathers were practical men, and their laconic 
drafting technique no doubt reflected awareness of the difficulty of laying 
down rules to govern situations whose dimensions were at best dimly 
grasped. The Framers and Ratifiers did seem clearly to appreciate the role 
of experience in shaping tenable rules. As Washington noted, "Time and 
habit are necessary to fix the true character of govemments."11 James 
Madison in remarks in the Virginia ratifying convention was also quite 
explicit about the need for experience, stating: 
the organization of the general government of the United States 
was, in all its parts, very difficult. There was a peculiar difficulty 
in that of the executive. Every thing incident to it must have 
participated in that difficulty. That mode which was judged most 
expedient was adopted till experience should point out one more 
eligible. 12 
9. See, e.g., 1 FARRAND 86 (Dickinson); 4 ELLIOT 120-22 (Davie); 2 id. at 34-35 (Madison); 
THE FEDERALIST Nos. 37, 47-48 & 51 (J. Madison) (E.H. Scotted. 1894). [subsequent citations 
to specific page numbers in THE FEDERAUST refer to this edition]; 5 ANNALS OF CoNo. 487 
(1796) (Madison). 
10. L. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT 430 (1968), quoted in Lofgren, War-Making 
Under The Constitution: The Original Understanding, 81 YALE L.J. 672, 696 n.104 (1972). 
11. W. MUNRO, THE MAKERS OF THE UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION 14 (1930); cf. R. HOFSTAOTER, 
THE AMERICAN PoLmCAL TRAomoN AND THE MEN WHo MADE IT 3-17 (1954). 
12. 3 ELLIOT 531. See also THE FEDERALIST Nos. 38, 43 & 47 (J. Madison); id. No. 81 (A. 
Hamilton). It may well be, however, that the Framers and Ratifiers expected experience to 
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While not among the Framers, Thomas Jefferson suggested in 1816: 
Some men look at constitutions with sanctimonious reverence, 
and deem them like the ark of the covenant, too sacred to be 
touched. They ascribe to the men of the preceding age a wisdom 
more than human, and suppose what they did to be beyond 
amendment. I knew that age well; I belonged to it, and labored 
with it. It deserved well of its country. It was very little like the 
present, but without the experience of the present; and forty 
years of experience in government is worth a century of book-
reading; and this they would say themselves, were they to rise 
from the dead . . . . Let us . . . avail ourselves of our reason and 
experience, to correct the crude essays of our first and unexperi-
enced, although wise, virtuous, and well-meaning councils.'' 
77 
Finally, deliberate ambiguity was very likely a means of producing 
agreement among fractious delegates. Gouverneur Morris, very influential 
in drafting the final version of the document, explained with regard to 
certain clauses that "it became necessary to select phrases which, express-
ing my own notions, would not alarm others .... ""For men whose over-
riding objective was ratification of a Constitution promising a more viable 
union, the precise meaning to be given to ambiguous but generally accept-
able language could await resolution in practice. 
be taken into account by the formal amendment of the Constitution rother than by its 
informal adaptation through court decisions or a process of claim and concession between the 
President and Congress. 
13. Letter to Samuel Kercheval, July 12, 1816, reprinted in M. McDOUGAL & AssoCJAT&S, 
STUDIES IN WoRLD PUBuc ORDER 619 n.9 (1960) [hereinafter cited as McDoUGAL]. 
14. 1 ELLIOT 506-07 (Letter to Timothy Pickering, Dec. 22, 1814). Morris referred to the 
language of Article ill; the rest of the Constitution he thought clear enough but not likely by 
itself to prevent legislative aggrandizement. He also told Pickering that the Constitutional 
Fathers' debates were of little moment in interpreting the document: 
!d. 
What can a history of the Constitution avail toward interpreting its provisions? 
This must be done by comparing the plain import of the words with the general 
tenor and object of the instrument. 
[A]fter all, what does it signify that men should have a written constitution, 
containing unequivocal provisions and limitations? The legislative lion will not 
be entangled in the meshes of a logical net. The legislature will always make the 
power which it wishes to exercise, unless it be so organized as to contain within 
itself the sufficient check . . . . The idea of binding legislators by oath is puerile. 
Having sworn to exercise the powers granted, accordingly to their true intent and 
meaning, they will, when they feel a desire to go farther, avoid the shame, if not 
the guilt, of perjury, by swearing the true intent and meaning to be, according to 
their comprehension, that which suits their purpose. 
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4. Gaps in Intent: Other Assumptions, Other Problems 
The Framers' and Ratifiers' assumptions about the nature of American 
foreign relations and government, and their focus on problems of the late 
1780's, simply precluded attention to many issues regarding the division 
of war-peace authority between the legislative and executive branches. In 
1787 it took eighteen days to move from Boston to Georgia. Economic and 
governmental divisions further heightened the separation of the American 
people. The country was little more than "a loose confederation of states, 
rife with sectional secession movements."15 Its constitutional necessities 
were, first, an allocation of authority between the national government and 
the states that would create a viable union, and second, a division of 
national authority between the representatives of the large and small 
states that would ensure ratification of the new plan of government. Of 
great concern also were basic institutional questions about the sort of 
national executive to be carved out of existing congressional government, 
for example, whether the Executive would be one person or several, act 
with or without a council, have veto power, how the Executive would be 
chosen, for what term, and with what possibility of re-election. But these 
issues were rarely considered with an eye to the respective roles of the 
President and Congress in determining American policy. To a large extent, 
they were merely another manifestation of the state-national conflict, the 
federalists favoring a stronger Executive than the states-righters. 
Foreign affairs as such were scarcely mentioned in either the Philadel-
phia or state debates, 16 and the only aspects of external relations to receive 
real attention were war and treaty-making.'7 As between them, the focus 
15. McDoUGAL, supra note 13, at 631. See also id. at 628 n.55; C. WARREN, supra note 8, at 
3-54. The evils of confederations were very much on the nationalists' minds. E.g., THE 
FEDERALIST No. 17 (A. Hamilton); id. Nos. 18-20 (A. Hamilton & J. Madison). 
16. America's external relations did figure more prominently in The Federalist. Hamilton 
in Federalist No. 17, at 93, described the federal government's concerns as principally "com· 
merce, finance, negotiation, and war," and Madison in No. 45, at 258, described federal 
powers as "few and defined" to be "exercised principally on external objects, as war, ponce, 
negotiation, and foreign commerce" and to be "most extensive and important in times of war 
and danger." Accord, e.g., id. Nos. 23 & 34 (A. Hamilton); id. No. 42 (J. Madison). As those 
and others of The Federalist suggest, foreign affairs were stressed to sell the Constitution. 
Disunited, the states were less efficient in diplomatic and military affairs, and their ineffi· 
ciency invited foreign aggression. Moreover, if wars and treaties were to be the main diet of 
the federal government, other public affairs would be left to state and local officials, and 
federal operations would usually be modest, since major military and diplomatic undertnk· 
ings were rarely expected. 
17. L. HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 129, 372 n.l (1972). It has been 
suggested that: 
The overemphasis upon treaties was ... natural, considering the time. In the 
nature of the case, the problem of a new nation is to negotiate treaties, either to 
gain recognition thereby, or to regularize its contact, commercial and political, 
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was on treaties, though the two merged whenever the Constitutional Fa-
thers turned to the termination of hostilities. 
Predominant attention could go to treaties, for peace was expected to be 
the customary state of the new nation. America would avoid aggressive war 
abroad, and in turn enjoy "an insulated situation" from the great powers 
of Europe. In Hamilton's words: 
Europe is at a great distance from us. Her colonies in our vicinity 
will be likely to continue too much disproportioned in strength 
to be able to give us any dangerous annoyance. Extensive mili-
tary establishments cannot, in this position, be necessary to our 
security. 18 
Commerical relations were to characterize American links with the rest 
of the world. Contacts of other sorts, not much desired, would be discour-
aged by hobbling treaty-making. In this vein, Go.uverneur Morris opined 
that "[i]n general he was not solicitous to multiply & facilitate Treaties," 
and James Madison believed that since Independence "it has been too easy 
... to make Treaties."19 This isolationist mood was perhaps a reaction to 
the hardships of the Revolution. It clearly fed on fear of great power inter-
ference in the domestic politics of the fledgling state, especially through 
bribery of federal politicians. :a The notion of peaceful retreat, in any event, 
with older nations. The routine relations of an established nation are of a different 
sort. The making of treaties occupies much less time and attention, proportion-
ately, and the interpretation of treaties, their application to particular cases, and> 
dealing with matters outside treaty relations bulk larger. 
H. WRISTON, EXECUTIVE AGENTS IN AMERICAN FOREIGN REuTIONS 60 (1929). 
18. THE FEDERALIST No.8, at 47. Hamilton, however, felt that geography v;ould protect only 
a unified country. See also id. No.4 (J. Jay); id. No. 41 (J. Madison). Richard B. Morris has 
~~ . 
Our Nation's independence was achieved in the first anticolonial war of modem 
times, but it was at its inception dedicated to peace not war. Only n peaceful 
climate, it was believed, would guarantee the American people life, liberty, and 
the pursuit of happiness. 
Hearings on War-Powers Legislation Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 92d 
Cong., 1st Sess. 76 (1971). See id. at 86 (remarks of Alfred H. Kelly); Lofgren, supra note 10, 
at 682 n.36, 694. 
19. 2 FARRAND 393 (Morris), 548 (Madison). James Wilson during the Pennsylvania ratify-
ing convention went even further to denigrate treaty-making: 
With regard to [the senators') power in making treaties, it is or importance that 
it should be very seldom exercised. We are happily removed from the vortex of 
European politics, and the fewer and the more simple our negotiations v.ith Euro-
pean powers, the better it will be. If such be the case, it v.ill be but once in n 
number of years that a single treaty wilt come before the Senate. I think therefore 
that on this account it will be unnecessary to sit constantly. 
See 2 EwOT 513; L. HENKIN, supra note 17, at 372 n.2; McDouGAL, supra note 13, at 627-28; 
Q. WRIG!rr, THE CoNTROL OF AMERICAN FoREIGN REunoNs 246 (1922). 
20. E.g., 2 FARRAND 268-72, 393, 452; 3 EwOT 220; THE FEDERALIST No.5 (J. Jay); id. N03. 
16, 22, 59 & 68 (A. Hamilton). · 
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firmly gripped Americans in the late 1780's. John Adams went so far as to 
suggest that the foreign service might usefully be abandoned, or radically 
reduced from its already meager proportions. 21 
The Constitutional Fathers' pacific view of foreign relations chilled their 
consideration of the use of American force abroad. They simply foresaw no 
such use except for defensive naval action to protect the Atlantic coast and 
American commerce and, possibly, to intervene in the Caribbean struggles 
of Old World powers.22 Though they did not expect foreign attack, the 
Framers and Ratifiers remained aware of its possibility, especially from 
Britain or Spain, the two powers holding territory abutting the United 
States, or from their Indian allies.23 Purely domestic troubles with the 
Indians, acute state rivalries, and Shay's Rebellion in 1786, made real the 
21. 8 WoRKS OF JoHN ADAMS 37 (C.F. Adams ed. 1853). See also 2 FARRAND 285 (Gerry). J. 
William Fulbright has suggested: 
Our institutional arrangements for foreign affairs were drafted in the late 18th 
century by men who assumed that these affairs would be few and insignificant. 
The Founding Fathers considered, for instance, that the Department of State 
would quite possibly wither away from disuse. 
Fulbright, American Foreign Policy in the 20th Century Under an 18th-Century Constitution, 
47 CORNELL L.Q. 1, 2 (1961). 
22. Hamilton wrote in Federalist No. 24 at 135, that a navy was crucial "If we mean to be 
a commerical people or even to be secure on our Atlantic side." In Federalist No. 34, at 176, 
he asked more broadly for effective defense: "Admitting that we ought to try the novel and 
absurd experiment in politics, of tying up the hands of government from offensive war, 
founded upon reasons of state; yet, certainly, we ought not to disable it from guarding the 
community against the ambition or enmity of other nations." See also id. Nos. 11 & 34 (A. 
Hamilton); id. No. 41 (J. Madison); 2 FARRAND 450; 2 ELUOT 143 (Thacher), 218 (Lansing). 
Hamilton in Federalist No. 11, at 62, briefly trafficked with a more offensive use of naval 
power in local waters: 
A farther resource for influencing the conduct of European nations toward us, in 
this respect [trade], would arise from the establishment of a Federal navy. There 
can be no doubt, that the continuance of the Union, under an efficient govern-
ment, would put it in our power ... to create a navy, which ... would at least 
be of respectable weight, if thrown into the scale of either of two contending 
parties. This would be more peculiarly the case, in relation to operations in the 
West Indies .... By a steady adherence to the Union, we may hope, ere long, 
to become the arbiter of Europe in America; and to be able to incline the balance 
of European competitions in this part of the world, as our interest may dictate. 
23. Other than as competitors for open areas of North America, Britain was feared for its 
forts in territory officially American, and Britain and Spain for their control of navigation on 
the St. Lawrence and Mississippi Rivers. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 15 (A. Hamilton). 
As suggested in note 16 supra, the specter of European attack was also raised to promote 
federal hegemony over foreign affairs. State authority in diplomatic and military affairs, it 
was said, led to violations of international law and just cause for foreign attack. THE 
FEDERAUST No.3 (J. Jay); id. Nos. 80-81 (A. Hamilton). Also, state authority in diplomatic 
and military matters bred national disarray rather than the "union and a good national 
government" essential "to put and keep" the American people "in such a situation as, instead 
of inviting war will tend to repress and discourage it." ld. No. 4, at 25 (J. Jay). Accord, id. 
1974] WAR POWERS ALLOCATION 81 
potential for war at home without foreign involvement. :tIt was no accident 
that the Constitution spoke of calling out the militia- viewed then as the 
mainstay of American armed force - "to execute the Laws of the Union, 
suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions." 
To ensure the anticipated peace and deter perceived threats to American 
security, the Constitutional Fathers saw the behavior of the States- not 
the respective powers of the President and Congress - as their major 
problem. Interstate conflicts and intrastate revolts disrupted internal tran-
quility, while American disunity and the provocative behavior of individ-
ual states invited foreign attack. Jefferson wrote Washington early in the 
Philadelphia Convention about the need "to make our states as one to all 
foreign concerns,"25 and Madison concluded that "(i]f we are to be one 
nation in any respect, it clearly ought to be in respect to other nations."u.a 
Since colonial days the states had been loathe to subordinate their im-
mediate individual interests to the common good. They were reluctant to 
bear their fair share of military burdens unless actually attacked, but 
prone themselves to incite Indians, European powers and their sister 
states. Separate diplomatic activity by them and their violation of national 
treaties were facts of life. Danger to the nation from state excesses in 
foreign affairs provided important impetus to the Constitutional Conven-
tion. Madison spoke in Philadelphia of "those violations of the law of 
nations & of Treaties which if not prevented must involve us in the calami-
ties of foreign wars," and said that "(t]he tendency of the States to these 
violations has been manifested in sundry instances." He continued: 
The ffies of Congs. contain complaints already, from almost every 
nation with which treaties have been formed. Hitherto indulg-
ence has been shown us. This cannot be the permanent disposi-
tion of foreign nations. A rupture with other powers is among the 
greatest of national calamities. It ought therefore to be effectually 
provided that no part of a nation shall have it in its power to bring 
Nos. 8, 15 & 24 (A. Hamilton); id. No. 41 (J. Madison). See also Lofgren, supra note 10, at 
687. 
Concern over foreign attack also had deeper roots. Many of the Framers and Ratifiers 
recognized the passing quality of peace. As George Nicholas urged during the Virginia ratify-
ing convention in response to argument that America would enjoy eternal peace: "Is this not 
deceiving ourselves? Is it not fallacious? Did there ever exist a nation which, at some point 
or another, was not exposed to war?" 3 ELLIOT 358. See also 2 id. at 143 {Thacher [Mass.)), 
217-19 (Lansing [N.Y.]), 379 (Duane [N.Y.)); THE FEDERALIST No. 34 (A. Hamilton). 
24. See, e.g., 1 FARRAND 316-18 (Madison); 2 id. at455,463 (Martin); 2 EwOT212 (Livings-
ton); 3 id. at 180 (Lee [Va.)), 424-25 (Madison); THE FEDERALIST No.3 (J. Jay); id. Nos. 6-8 
& 21 (A. Hamilton). 
25. C. WARREN, supra note 8, at 451 (Letter of Aug. 14, 1787). 
25.1. THE FEDERALIST No. 42, at 232. 
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them on the whole. The existing confederacy does (not) suffi-
ciently provide against this evil.26 
Significantly, the Constitutional Fathers found the supremacy of na-
tional treaties over state law far more troublesome than the manner in 
which the United States would itself make treaties. By the same token, 
they were vastly more concerned to define national war-peace authority, 27 
already great in theory under the Confederation, 28• than to allocate war 
powers qetween the President and Congress. And they apparently felt it 
more essential to grant emergency military powers to the states than to the 
national executive, probably on the assumption that state militia would 
26. 1 FARRAND at 316. See also 1 id. at 171 (Pinckney), 426 (Wilson), 513 (Morris); L. 
HENKIN, supra note 16, at 290-91 n.10, 295 n.8, 373 n.3; McDouGAL, supra note 14, nt 466-
620. 
27. The state-federal struggle for control of American armed forces dominated the contro-
versy over control of military power during the drafting and ratifying conventions. E.g., 
Donahoe & Smelser, The Congressional Power to Raise Armies: The Constitutional and 
Ratifying Conventions, 33 REV. OF PoL. 202 (1971). 
28. Articles of Confederation III and VI through IX dealt with diplomatic and military 
affairs. Much of their detail concerned raising, organizing, and supporting the military, 
leaving significant authority in the states. War and treaty-making, however, were lnrgoly 
preserves of the central government: 
Article 6. No state, without the consent of . . . Congress . . . , shall send any 
embassy to, or receive any embassy from, or enter into any conference, agreement, 
alliance, or treaty, with any king, prince, or state; .... 
No state shall engage in any war without the consent of Congress ... unless such 
state be actually invaded by enemies, or shall have received certain advice of n 
resolution being formed by some nation of Indians to invade such state, and the 
danger is so imminent as not to admit of a delay till . . . Congress . . . can be 
consulted; nor shall any state grant commissions to any ships or vessels of war, 
nor letters of marque and reprisal, except it be after a declaration of war by . . . 
Congress . . . and then only against the . . . state . . . against which war has 
been so declared, and under such regulations as shall be established by . . . 
Congress . . . unless such state be infested by pirates, in which case, vessels of 
war may be fitted out for that occasion, and kept so long as the danger shall 
continue or until . . . Congress . . . shall determine otherwise. 
Article 9. The United States in Congress assembled shall have the sole and exclu-
sive right and power of determining on war, except in the cases mentioned in the 
sixth article - of sending and receiving ambassadors - entering into treaties and 
alliances; . . . of granting letters of marque and reprisal in times of pence . . . . 
The United States in Congress assembled shall also have the sole and exclusive 
right and power of . . . making rules for the government and regulation of the 
[national] land and naval forces, and directing their operations. 
1 ELLIOT at 79-82. Those favoring ratification of the Constitution argued that these powers 
were illusory, since the national government remained dependent on the states for the means 
of their execution. See THE FEDERALIST Nos. 22 & 25 (A. Hamilton); id. No. 38 (J. Madison). 
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bear the first brunt of repelling sudden attack. Thus, while the Executive's 
emergency prerogative is mentioned only briefly in a confusing fragment 
of the Philadelphia debates, the states' appears explicitly in the Constitu-
tion.29 
True, impetus to Philadelphia also stemmed from concern that the na-
tional government was inefficiently discharging its foreign and military 
responsibilities. But the Framers and Ratifiers sought to end this ineffi-
ciency, in part, by loosening the hold of individual states on congressional 
action and by restructuring Congress to make it a more viable executive 
force.30 Their other remedies were only slightly more effective in dividing 
authority between the President and the legislators. To relieve the clumsy 
handling of foreign affairs, the Constitutional Fathers finally opted for 
close collaboration between the Executive and Senate, an arrangement 
that seemed realistic given the anticipated governments of national unity 
and the belief that the Senate would be institutionally capable of handling 
diplomatic business. 
As regards military affairs, there was no dissatisfaction with congres-
sional capacity to make policy, except in cases of sudden attack, and for 
sudden attack the explicit constitutional remedy was emergency action by 
the states. Military inefficiency, rather, was seen in the efforts of Congress 
to implement its policy through operational command of American forces. 
Here consensus existed that an Executive was needed to serve as first 
general and admiral of the nation's army and navy. 
The demons arising out of that command for the Framers and Ratifiers 
were not ours. Their abiding fear was that the Executive would use the 
military for tyrannical purposes at home, possibly to make himself a hered-
itary prince, not that he would use it for ill-advised foreign adventures. 
Thus, controversy centered on whether it was safe to allow executive com-
mand in the field, whether standing armies might be used by the President 
for domestic subversion, and whether he should be allowed to pardon trai-
tors, since their crimes could stem from efforts to help him usurp power. 
Plenary congressional authority over raising, supporting and organizing 
the military, coupled with little reliance on a standing army and navy, was 
widely thought to be an adequate bar to presidential usurpation - as it 
would have seemed sufficient protection against his unauthorized inter-
vention abroad, had that seemed credible in 1787-88. For some of the 
29. U.S. CoNST. art. I, §10. Cf. 3 EwOT at 424-25 (Madison). 
30. As Madison argued: 
The proper remedy for this [lack of national officials responsible for American 
policy] must be an additional body in the legislative department, which having 
sufficient permanency to provide for such objects as require a continued attention 
and train of measures, may be justly and effectually answerable for the attain-
ment of those objects. 
THE FEDERALIST No. 63, at 346-47. 
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Constitutional Fathers, quaintly, there were no executive demons in mili-
tary matters, only congressional: the legislators were said to hold both the 
purse and the sword, and thus to be feared as incipient military despots. 
For these Framers and Ratifiers, of course, remedy lay in state control of 
American armed forces- that is, heavy federal reliance on state militia, 
state officers, and state military appropriations. 
5. Dangers of Extrapolation 
It is hazardous to seek to fill gaps in the Framers' and Ratifiers' intent 
by extrapolation from their debates on the war powers. They acted on the 
basis of many factual assumptions that no longer hold, and they often 
seem obsessed with ephemeral economic and security concerns.31 What 
the Constitutional Fathers would have thought given later twentieth cen-
tury realities often cannot be safely predicted from what they said given 
circumstances of the late 1780's. What, for instance, if they had realized 
that peace and noninvolvement with the rest of the world would not be 
America's customary state? That the hazards, pace and complexity of 
international affairs would radically increase, along with the country's 
capacity and need to work its will abroad? That declarations of war and 
treaties would hardly prove to be the guts of American war and peace? 
That from the outset the Senate could not keep step with the President in 
governing our foreign relations, and the militia could not replace standing 
armies? That the regular military would grow gargantuan, little restrained 
by the congressional capacity to raise and support, and that the loyalty of 
naturalized citizens, the navigation of the Mississippi, and other compel-
ling issues of the late eighteenth century would quickly fade? 
There are, of course, aspects of the 1787 understandings not rooted in 
the passing assumptions and problems of those years. But any attempt to 
extrapolate from the Framers' and Ratifiers' expressed intentions to cover 
gaps in their war-power debates must have its adequacy measured by 
reference to questions such as those above, and it must convincingly rebut 
the possibility that the extrapolation is too speculative to be meaningful. 
In short, fragmentary evidence of the debates, the limited extent to 
which there is ever common purpose in any process as lengthy, 
contentious, and complex as the drafting and ratifying of the Constitution, 
the chance that the text includes deliberately ambiguous language to be 
shaped by experience, the presence of gaps in intent caused by assump-
tions and problems peculiar to the late 1780's, and the dangers of extending 
what was said then about the war powers, in response to concrete problems 
of that era, to unforeseen issues in unforeseen times - all these demand 
31. See, e.g., 2 FARRAND 268-72, 359-63, 499-503. 
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restrained judgments of what the Framers and Ratifiers really had in 
mind. 
B. Sources of Intent 
The relevant provisions of the Constitution are an authoritative - but 
extremely vague - guide to the Constitutional Fathers' war-power inten-
tions. These provisions are considered here only as they figure in the 1787-
88 debates. Primary attention goes to the debates, with a look at three 
other sorts of evidence as well. First is the historical and intellectual con-
text in which the Framers and Ratifiers lived. Context suggests, for in-
stance, the evils against which the Constitution is meant to guard and 
definitions for its generalities. The Framers and Ratifiers, well read in 
history and political theory, seemed eager to take contextual considera-
tions into account in molding their new country.32 
Second is contemporaneous construction: the interpretation given con-
stitutional language, once it has gone into effect, by men who participated 
in its framing and ratification and by their contemporaries. During heated 
debate in 1831 over the President's constitutional prerogative to appoint 
special diplomatic agents, Senator Livingston made classic recourse to 
contemporaneous construction, arguing that the interpretation which be 
favored 
was made in the earliest years of the Federal Government, by the 
man who presided in the convention which made that Constitu-
tion, acting with the advice and assistance of the leading mem-
bers of that body, all fresh from its discussion; men who had 
taken prominent parts in every question that arose . . . . 
By these men, with this perfect and recent knowledge of the 
Constitution, acting under the solemn obligation to preserve it 
inviolate and without any possible motive to make them forget 
their duty, was this first precedent set; without a single doubt on 
the mind that it was correct; without protest, without even re-
mark.33 
But contemporaneous construction must be gingerly handled. There is no 
reason to believe that the Framers and Ratifiers became more clear as to 
32. E.g., THE FEoERAUST Nos. 38, 52 & 63 (J. Madison). But Madison also noted that 
although Americans "paid a decent regard to the opinions of former times and other nations, 
they have not suffered a blind veneration for antiquity, for custom, or for names to overrule 
the suggestions of their own good sense, the knowledge of their own situation, and the lessons 
of their own experience." I d. No. 14, at 79. See also THE FEDERALIST PAPERS xix-:a, 292 n.25 
(R. Fairfield ed. 1966) [hereinafter cited as The Federalist Papers); Lofgren, supra note 10, 
at 689-90. 
33. 11 T. BENTON, BENTON'S AmuoGEMENT OF 1HE DEBATES OF CoNGRESS 220·22 (1857). 
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their intentions after their conventions than during them. 
Third are publications issued during the ratification process, construing 
the Constitution in attempts either to encourage or deter its acceptance. 
Far and away the most significant of these efforts was The Federalist. It 
will be extensively considered here, but with several grains of salt. Its 
essays lack the authoritative status of debates in either the Philadelphia 
or state conventions. They were simply promotional literature, devoted to 
rebutting the "gorgons, hydras, and chimeras dire,'; seen in the Constitu-
tion by its foes. 34 And, The Federalist almost surely did not have the same 
impact on the constitutional understanding of the Ratifiers as it has had 
on the views of subsequent generations. As McLaughlin wrote in 1935: 
[T]hese essays were probably of service in winning support of 
the Constitution; but the extent of that service we naturally can-
not measure. For much immediate practical effect they were per-
haps too learned, too free from passion . . . . The Federalist 
probably had more effect after the new government went into 
operation than in the days of uncertainty when the fate of the 
union seemed to hang in the balance . . . . as 
Against this background, we turn to a more specific examination of the 
Framers' and Ratifiers' intentions. We will move from context to the Phila-
delphia Convention, and then to the ratification process, considering there 
the state debates, promotional publications, and a bit of contemporaneous 
construction. 
II. THE FRAMERS AND RATIFIERS: THE CONTEXT IN WHICH THEY MEr 
To the extent that the Framers and Ratifiers did consider how to allocate 
the war powers between the legislative and executive branches, they were 
clearly influenced by the context in which the constitutional conventions 
met. A sketch of that context usefully touches on British practice, contem-
porary political theory, and earlier American government, both national 
and state. 
A. British Practice and Political Theory 
The Framers and Ratifiers looked for their historical lessons to Greece 
34. THE FEDERAUST No. 29, at 158 (A. Hamilton). 
35. A. McLAUGHUN, A CoNSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 208-09 (1935). Fair· 
field states that "[s)ince some of the most controversial points in the Constitution were not 
discussed until most of the state conventions had been held, the probability is that The 
Federalist was not too influential." The Federalist Papers, supra note 32, at 280·81 n.20. But 
he also notes that the extent of their influence has been controversial and cites representative 
opinion. Id. at ix-xi. 
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and Rome, France, Holland, the Holy Roman Empire and others, but 
above all to England. Hamilton, speaking of "the exclusion of military 
establishments in time of peace," noted that "as a national sentiment, it 
must be traced to those habits of thinking which we derive from the nation 
from whom the inhabitants of these States have in general sprung. "l.S 
The Crown controlled British foreign and military affairs with little 
parliamentary check until the seventeenth century. Then wielding the 
power of the purse, the legislators moved radically to reduce royal preroga-
tive over these areas. During the course of a century of Stuart absolutism, 
civil war, Commonwealth, Restoration and Glorious Revolution, Parlia-
ment confirmed its authority over levying taxes, including those for mili-
tary ends; established its right to condition military appropriations, for 
instance, by voting funds for use only in disbanding the army; and ac-
quired control over raising and maintaining standing armies in time of 
peace. The legislators also enlarged their say in foreign affairs, especially 
treaty-making. Following the Restoration, the Crown's authority as 
commander-in-chief began to unravel, though it was buttressed ironically 
by public distaste for the military policy of John Churchill, the Duke of 
Marlborough. He shaped British use of force in the early 1700's when the 
War of the Spanish Succession coincided with flaccid Queen Anne, using 
his strength in the field and Parliament to pursue campaigns distasteful 
to most of his countrymen. Finally, the emerging authority of the cabinet 
and its responsibility to Parliament grew steadily during the 1700's until 
by the time of the Constitutional Conventions there remained fittle purely 
royal prerogative over British foreign and military affairs.37 Significantly, 
the legislators controlled British policy through statutory requests that the 
Crown act "by and with the advice and consent" of Parliament.J.S 
36. THE FEDERALIST No. 26, at 141. Reference to British practice was frequent during the 
Philadelphia and state conventions, and in The Federalist. See, e.g., 1 FARRAND S.S-66 (Wilson 
& Randolph), 97 (Sherman), 289 (Hamilton), 391 (Butler), 398-40-i (Pinckney); 2 id. at 104 
(Morris), 274 (Mason); 3 ELUOT 16-17 (Nicholas [Va.)), 393 (Madison); THE FEDERAUST N03. 
26, 70 & 84 (A. Hamilton) (references to the British Constitution and laws); id. N03. 37, 45 
& 56 (J. Madison). 
37. There are a number of sources which trace Parliament's increasing authority during 
the eighteenth century. See generally Hearings on Congress, the President and the War 
Powers Before the Subcomm. on National Security Policy and Scientific Deuelopments of the 
House Foreign Affairs Comm., 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 513-15 (1970) (Chnyes & Michelmnn, 
Legal Memorandum on the Constitutionality of the Amendment to End the War); E. MAY, 
THE ULTIMATE DECISION: THE PRESIDENT AS Co~tMANDER IN CHIEF 13-19 (1950); Q. WruoHT, 
supra note 19, at 143-44; Berger, The Presidential Monopoly of Foreign Relations, 71 Mtcll. 
L. REv. 1, 7-9 (1972); Berger, War-Making by the President, 121 U. PA. L. RE\'. 29, 32, 78 
n.315, 79 (1972); Lofgren, supra note 10, at 697-99; Note, The War-Making Powers: The 
Intentions of the Framers in the Light of Parliamentary History, 50 B.U.L. REv. 5 (Special 
Issue, Spring 1970). 
38. Colonial legislatures in America used "advice and consent" similarly. See H. Wrusros, 
supra note 17, at 63-71. 
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The Framers and Ratifiers did not dwell on the emerging executive-in-
Parliament, though there was some awareness of its existence.39 To the 
extent that the rise of the cabinet was perceived, it very likely was viewed 
as an abuse of the separation of legislative and executive powers, a princi-
ple dear to the Constitutional Fathers and to the political theorists whom 
they favored.~0 Primary attention went to seventeenth-century lessons41 
and thus to executive despotism and its legislative remedies. The potential 
. 
tyranny of standing armies during peace was stressed, and the burdens of 
ill-advised royal wars noted.42 The king was frequently portrayed as having 
great foreign and military authority, an exemplar of what the American 
Executive was not to be. 43 
39. For example, Gouverneur Morris addressed the Philadelphia Convention on removal 
of the real British executive by party intrigue: 
Some leader of party will always covet his seat, will perplex his administration, 
will cabal with the Legislature, till he succeeds in supplanting him. This was the 
way in which the King of England was got out, he meant the real King, the 
Minister. 
2 FARRAND 104. James Wilson argued: "The people of Amer. did not oppose the British King 
but the Parliament- the opposition was not agst. an Unity but a corrupt multitude .•.. " 
1 Id. at 71. See also W. BINKLEY, THE MAN IN THE WHITE HousE, H1s PowERS & DtrriES 290· 
91 (1959) (colonies were loyal to the King but disapproved of "ministerial policies"), 
40. The necessity for separation was a frequent theme during the federal and state conven-
tions, e.g., 2 FARRAND 537 (Mason), 538-39 (Wilson); 4 ELUOT 56 (Lenoir [N.C.]); with 
Montesquieu seen as its greatest prophet, e.g., 2 FARRAND 34 (Madison); THE FEDERAUST No. 
47 (J. Madison); The Federalist Papers, supra note 32, at 297-98 n.60. Later, Madison stated 
in Congress that "if there is a principle in our constitution . . . more sacred than another, it 
is that which separates the legislative, executive, and judicial powers." 1 ANNALS OF CoNo. 
604 (1789). The Constitutional Fathers stressed on other occasions, however, the overlapping 
nature of legislative, executive and judicial powers - a necessary concomitant of checks and 
balances. 
41. See B. BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLtmON (1967). 
42. E.g., 2 FARRAND 616-17 (Mason & Madison). John Jay warned that: 
absolute monarchs will often make war when their nations are to get nothing by 
it; but for purposes and objects merely personal, such as thirst for military glory, 
revenge for personal affronts, ambition, or private compacts to aggrandize or 
support their particular families or partisans. These, and a variety of other mo-
tives, which affect only the mind of the sovereign, often lead him to engage in wars 
not sanctioned by justice or the voice and interests of his people. 
THE FEDERALIST No. 4, at 24. 
The Framers and Ratifiers also took a dim view of the Duke of Malborough's role in 
prolonging the War of the Spanish Succession "beyond the limits marked out by sound policy, 
and for a considerable time in opposition to the views of the Court." Id. No. 6, at 35 (A. 
Hamilton). Accord, 2 FARRAND 541 (Butler). 
43. See 2 FARRAND 393 (Johnson); 3 id. at 302 (Letter from Pierce Butler to Weedon Butler, 
May 5, 1788); 4 ELLIOT at 107-08 (Iredell), 269 (Pringle [S.C.]), 277-79 (Pinckney). See also 
THE FEDERALIST Nos. 67 & 68 (A. Hamilton). However, these protestations of regal might were 
somewhat inconsistent with the Constitutional Fathers' belief that Parliament had greatly 
curbed the King's power. No doubt there was an element of gamesmanship involved in 
aggrandizing the King. Those in favor of the Constitution could then show how pallid and 
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In their concern to contain executive power with legislative, the Framers 
and Ratifiers may well have been influenced by Whig theorists, as well as 
by their concept of British constitutional history.~• They were also aware 
of the distinction drawn by theorists, principally John Locke, between 
purely executive prerogative, on the one band, and federative authority on 
the other, the former concerning law enforcement and the latter the con-
duct of external affairs, including war and peace. They knew too, of the 
theorists' emphasis on the institutional advantages of the executive in 
handling foreign and military matters.ts 
Another important European influence on the Constitutional Fathers 
concerned the character of war: whether it might be entered without a 
formal declaration, at what levels of force it might arise, and the role of 
marque and reprisal in its prosecution. Theorists knovm to educated Amer-
icans in the 1780's, especially Grotius, Pufendorf, Vattel, and Burlamaqui, 
differed over whether a declaration was necessary to initiate unjust war, 
but agreed that none was needed to enter defensive hostilities. They exam-
ined in detail undeclared or "imperfect" war, noting that it was generally 
limited in scope, designed to redress grievances and prosecuted through 
restricted government action or private war-making under letters of 
marque and reprisal. They agreed further that it could easily lead to out-
right or "perfect" war.~6 
Public naval reprisals, in fact, had gone before British wars with the 
Dutch in 1652 and 1664, the Spanish in 1739 and the French in 1756. And 
unthreatening the President was in comparison. Those opposed could argue that, under the 
proposed government, Congress would be dangerously powerful lacking the executive check 
on the legislature provided in Britain by the King. Compare 3 Ewor 16-17 (Nicholns [Va.)) 
with 3 id. at 379 (Mason). 
44. See Lofgren, supra note 10, at 698-99. 
45. See E. CoRWIN, THE PRESIDENT: OmCE AND PowERS 1787-1957, at 416-18 n.l (4th rev. 
ed. 1957); L. IIENKIN, supra note 17, at 197 n.10; Q. WRIGHT, supra note 19, at 141-43, 3S3-
65. James Wilson, on the other hand, said in Philadelphia that "[m)nking peace and war 
arc generally determined by Writers on the Laws of Nations to be legislative powers." 1 
FARRAND 73-74. And, as we shall see, none save William R. Davie and John Francis Mercer 
suggested that treaty-making should be left to the Executive, see text at notes 94 and 203 
infra; and only Pierce Butler, in a momentary aberration, argued that war-making should be 
presidential, see text at note 96 infra. Also, as will become apparent, executive speed and 
secrecy were cited as grounds for presidential conduct of war and involvement in negotiations 
with other states, not as grounds for presidential prerogative over policy. See, e.g., text at 
note 189 infra. 
46. Note the discussion and authorities in Lofgren, supra note 10, at 689-93. The Federal 
Court of Appeals, established under the Articles of Confederation to deal with prize cases, 
explained that: 
The writers upon the law of nations, speaking of the different kinds of war, 
distinguish them into perfect and imperfect: A perfect war is that which destroys 
the national peace and tranquility, and lays the foundation of every possible act 
of hostility; The imperfect war is that which does not entirely destroy the public 
tranquility, but interrupts it only in some particulars, as in the cnse of reprisals. 
Miller v. The Ship Resolution, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 1, 21 (1781). 
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undeclared war was the norm in eighteenth-century European practice, a 
reality brought home to Americans when Britain's Seven Years War with 
France began on this continent.47 Thus, the Framers and Ratifiers knew 
that war might be limited or general, that marque and reprisal were a 
means of waging limited hostilities, and that even major conflict generally 
began without prior declaration. 
B. American Practice 
As Edward Corwin has noted, America ceased to be a colony "with the 
belief prevalent that 'the executive magistracy' was the natural enemy, the 
legislative assembly the natural friend of liberty . . . . " 48 "Fear of a return 
of Executive authority like that exercised by the Royal Governors or by the 
King," according to Charles Warren, "had been ever present in the states 
from the beginning of the Revolution. "49 Much of the American antipathy 
for executive authority no doubt stemmed from the fact that the colonial 
assemblies were locally chosen and the royal governors appointed by Lon-
don. 50 A measure of it, however, resulted from the colonists' distaste for 
British use of troops to enforce unpopular policies, especially economic. 
That use came to be attributed to the Crown, and reinforced the aversion 
to peace-time armies born of seventeenth-century experience in Britain 
itself. The Declaration of Independence captured prevailing distrust of 
armed executives: 
The history of the present King of Great Britain is a history of 
repeated injuries and usurpations, all having in direct object the 
establishment of an absolute Tyranny over these States . . . . 
He has kept among us, in times of peace, Standing Armies 
without the consent of our legislature. 
He has affected to render the Military independent of and su-
perior to the Civil Power. 
These themes recurred frequently in the years leading to the Constitu-
tional Conventions, along with strong preference for militia rather than 
standing armies as America's peace-time military deterr(,nt.51 
47. See McDoUGAL, supra note 13, at 715 n.135; Lofgren, supra note 10, at 693. Cf. TilE 
FEDERALIST No. 25 (A. Hamilton) ("the ceremony of a formal denunciation of war has of late 
fallen in disuse"). 
48. E. CoRWIN, supra note 45, at 5·6. However, as noted in note 39 supra, aversion to the 
Executive was mixed with some awareness that America's difficulties with Britain had Parlia-
mentary origins as well. 
49. C. WARREN, supra note 8, at 173. 
50. 1 THE WoRKS or JAMES WILSON 292-93 (R. McCloskey ed. 1967). See Berger, War-
Making by the President, 121 U. PA. L. REv. 29, 32 (1972). 
51. Before the Declaration of Independence, the first Continental Congress attacked the 
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The Continental Congresses responded to fear of executives by having 
none formally. Though the presiding officer of Congress was termed "The 
President," he mainly chaired debate. The legislators, acting through their 
unicameral assembly and various committees and boards established by 
it, sought to execute national affairs.~2 They did find it necessary to ap-
point a commander-in-chief for the American revolutionary forces, and 
chose George Washington on June 19, 1775, instructing him, however, 
"punctually to observe and follow such orders and directions, from time 
to time, as you shall receive from this or a future Congress . . . or a 
committee of Congress, for that purpose appointed." The legislators then 
appointed various bodies to oversee the war effort, and were prone early 
in the conflict to instruct Washington in the minutiae of its conduct.$) 
The Articles of Confederation came into effect on March 1, 1781, still 
without any national administrator, except as the executive existed in 
Congress and its agents. Executive departments responsible to Congress 
did begin to appear in 1781, including Foreign Affairs and War/' but the 
Confederation had no need to allocate war powers between executive and 
legislative branches. The Articles simply gave Congress "the sole and ex-
clusive right and power of determining on peace and war" and of "making 
rules for government and regulation of the . . . land and naval forces, and 
for directing their operations."~ Congress also largely controlled letters of 
marque and reprisal, though the states could issue them under certain 
limited circumstances. Ambiguity about the meaning of the word "de-
clare" in the war-power context, in fact, began then, since the Articles 
stationing of British Armies in America during peace and voted that "the keeping a standing 
army in these colonies, in times of peace, without the consent of the legislature of that colony 
in which such army is kept, is against the law." 2 JOURNALS OF THE CoNTU.'E.'>'TAL CONGRESS 
96 (1905). The Virginia Constitution of 1776 included among the fundamental rights of man: 
That a well-regulated militia composed of the body of the people, trained to arms, 
is the proper, natural and safe defense of a free State; that standing armies in 
time of peace should be avoided as dangerous to liberty; and that in all CD.Ses the 
military should be under strict subordination to, and governed by, the civil power. 
Quoted in C. RossiTER, SEEDTIME OF THE REPUBUC 400 (1953). See also Donahoe & Smelser, 
supra note 27. 
52. See E. BURNETT, THE CoNTINENTAL CoNGRESS 34 (1941); J. Guggenheimer, The Develop-
ment of the Executive Department, 1775-1789, in EssAYS IN THE CossnnmoNAL HlsroRY OF 
THE UNITED STATES IN THE FoRMATIVE PERIOD 1775-1789, at 116-85 (J. Jameson ed. 1889); H. 
WRISTON, supra note 17, at 3-26. 
53. See, e.g., Hearings on War-Power Legislation Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign 
Relations, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 77-78 (1972) (remarks of Richard B. Morris); R. Russell, The 
United States Congress and the Power to Use Military Force Abroad 11-15 (unpubli.ahed 
thesis, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University) (1967); Wormuth, The 
Nixon Theory of the War Power: A Critique, 60 CAUF. L. REv. 623, 638-39 (1972). 
54. Guggenheimer, supra note 52, at 146, 153-85. 
55. ART. OF CoNFED. art. IX, reprinted in note 28 supra. 
92 VmmNIA JouRNAL oF INTERNATIONAL LAW [VoL. 15:1 
spoke both of Congress' "determining on war" and of state marque and 
reprisal after a congressional "declaration of war."~8 It appears that 
determine and declare were used interchangeably. 
State constitutions after 1776 proved only slightly less extreme in their 
rejection of executive authority. Independent state executives were created 
but with narrow powers, and sometimes with the requirement that they 
govern in tandem with a council - a post-revolutionary adaptation of one 
means of hamstringing colonial governors. Executive councils had long 
been in America, often associated with the upper house of the legislature.'7 
Care was taken that the executives not "under any pretence, exercise any 
power or prerogative, by virtue of any law, statute or custom of England. "'8 
In Madison's words, "(t]he Executives of the States are in general little 
more than Cyphers; the legislators omnipotent. "59 
Almost every state did make its governor commander-in-chief of the 
local militia, but pursuant to legislative direction. The pertinent provision 
of the Massachusetts Constitution in 1780- which Hamilton in Federalist 
No. 69 termed possibly more expansive in empowering the executive than 
the equivalent clause in the federal constitution - named the governor 
"commander-in-chief of the army and navy" with power to "repel, resist, 
expel" invaders of Massachusetts, and "with all these and other powers 
incident to the offices of captain-general and commander-in-chief, and 
admiral, to be exercised agreeable to the rules and regulations of the con-
stitution and the laws of the land and not otherwise."80 
Out of this national and state experience, there seems to have emerged 
little if any dissatisfaction with legislative control over decisions to go to 
war and make peace. Even in colonial times, the legislators had dominated 
these determinations, 81 one way or another. They wholly controlled them 
56. Compare ART. OF CoNFED. art. IX with ART. OF CoNFED. art. VI, supra note 28. 
57. Delaware in its post-independence constitution, even conditioned executive command 
of the militia on the concurrence of a council: 
The President, with the advice and consent ofthe privy council, may embody the 
militia, and act as captain-general and commander-in-chief of them, and the 
other military force of this State, under the laws of the same. 
1 F. THORPE, THE FEDERAL AND STATE CoNSTlTUTIONS 564 (1909). See also THE FEDERALIST No. 
70 (A. Hamilton); A. NEVINs, THE AMERICAN STATES DURING AND AFTER TilE REvoLUTION, 1775-
1789, at 117-205 (1924); H. WRISTON, supra note 17, at 65-68. 
58. The Virginia Constitution of 1776, supra note 51. See also 2 B. PooRE, THE FEDERAL 
AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND 0TI!ER ORGANIC LAWS OF THE UNITED 
STATES 1910-11 (1878); THE FEDERAUST No. 47 (J. Madison); Berger, War-Making by the 
President, 121 U. PA. L. REv. 29, 32-33 (1972). 
59. 2 FARRAND 35. Accord, THE FEDERAUST No. 48 (J. Madison). 
60. 1 B. PooRE, supra note 58, at 965-66. See Berger, War-Making by the President, 121 
u. PA. L. REV. 29, 37 (1972). 
61. Colonial legislators found their control over appropriations particularly useful in this 
regard. See W. BINKLEY, supra note 39, at 3·4; E. MAY, supra note 37, at 9-10; R. Russell, 
supra note 53, at 2-11, 22. 
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thereafter. Nor had fear of executive usurpation lessened dramatically by 
1787-88, particularly should a standing army during peace be at executive 
disposal. But there had by that time developed growing awareness that 
legislatures could be tyrannical too, and that Congress to date had lacked 
the capacity to execute policy efficiently, especially foreign and military 
policy. There was related awareness that the legislatures had not been at 
their best during crises. 
Disenchantment with legislative good faith had been sparked by the 
excesses of state assemblies. 82 Madison suggested that the dangers of legis-
lative tyranny had escaped the "founders of our republics," so that 
they seem never for a moment to have turned their eyes from the 
danger to liberty from the overgrown and all-grasping prerogative 
of an hereditary magistrate . . . . They seem never to have recol-
lected the danger from legislative usurpations, which, by assem-
bling all power in the same hands, must lead to the same tyranny 
as is threatened by executive usurpations.113 
Thus, a national executive was thought necessary by many to check and 
balance Congress. 
Disenchantment with legislative capacity to conduct military and for-
eign affairs had begun early during the Revolutionary War. Congress con-
ceded a measure of institutional weakness in orders to General Washington 
issued just the day after he had been told to obey the legislature in all 
things. The second-round orders acknowledged that "whereas all particu-
lars cannot be foreseen, nor positive instructions for such emergencies so 
before hand given but that many things must be left to your prudent and 
discreet management. "84 As the conflict progressed and congressional ef-
forts to conduct it proved disastrous, the legislators left more and more to 
Washington, especially during times of great emergency.113 Consensus 
formed that, though Congress might decide on war and peace, a separate 
executive was needed to provide unified command. 
The legislators were not notably more successful in their discharge of the 
nonmilitary aspects of foreign affairs. Innumerable ad hoc committees 
were appointed to handle various diplomatic and treaty initiatives. Back-
62. Arbitrary actions by the new legislatures created some resentment. See, e.g., R. BER· 
GER, CoNGRESS v. THE SUPREME CoURT 10-12 (1969). 
63. THE FEDERALIST No. 48, at 274 (J. Madison). 
64. 2 JoURNALS OF THE CoNTINENTAL CoNGRESS 101 (1905). 
65. Randolph, in the Virginia ratifying convention, closed a 
catalogue of the evils of the dissolution ofthe Union by recalling ••• what passed 
in the year 1781. Such was the situation of our affairs then, that the power of 
dictator was given to the commander-in-chief, to save us from destruction. 
3 ELLIOT 79. See C. BERDAHL, WAR PowERS OF THE EXEctmVE IN nm UNITED STATES 18 (1921); 
cf. 2 ELLIOT 359-60. 
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biting among committee members, lapses of essential confidentiality, and 
frequent failure to delegate adequate operational authority to agents were 
endemic.66 A part of the difficulty lay in the stranglehold of individual 
states on congressional action and in the absence of any element within 
Congress composed of a few legislators with lengthy tenure and ensured 
continuity. Under the Confederation, voting in Congress continued to be 
by states irrespective of population, with congressional delegates elected 
annually by the state legislatures, and a nine vote majority required to 
approve major diplomatic or military actionY The yearly assemblies func-
tioned as had their predecessors, "essentially . . . as councils of ambassa-
dorial delegates from a group of federated states."68 
By 1787, it was apparent to most interested Americans that the national 
legislature as then constituted could not execute diplomatic or military 
policy. Congress restructured could reasonably be expected to become a 
more potent executive force. But there also was strong, though by no 
means universal, sentiment that effective implementation of American 
policy would also require a national administrator, independent to one 
degree or another from Congress. 
Even so, the major impetus toward an executive was not foreign affairs, 
but belief that purely domestic tranquility called for something more than 
congressional government. Enforcing national law and quelling insurgents 
seemed the more compelling needs. In Hamilton's words: 
Energy in the Executive, is a leading character in the definition 
of good government. It is essential . . . to the steady administra-
66. See H. WRISTON, supra note 17, at 17-26. On the general executive incompetence of 
Congress, see Guggenheimer, supra note 52, at 120-26, 136-37, 142-52. 
67. Each state retained the power to replace any of its delegates or to recall its en tiro 
delegation at any time. The delegates' salaries were fixed and paid by the states, and no 
delegate could serve more than three terms in any six-year period. Moreover, each state's 
delegates voted as a unit rather than individually. ART. OF CONFED. art. V. 
Congress could appoint a "committee of the states," composed of one delegate from each 
state, to conduct national affairs during congressional recesses. Even in this committee, tho 
consent of nine states was required in order to approve military or diplomatic actions. Also, 
Congress could annually appoint one delegate to be "president" but no delegate could servo 
more than once in any three-year period. !d. art. IX. 
68. McDouGAL, supra note 13, at 620. In Max Farrand's words, the country was run by "a 
congress of states." M. FARRAND, THE FRAMING OF THE CoNSTITUTION 3-4 (1913). Hamilton had 
savage words for Confederation practice: 
Congress, from the non-attendance of a few States, have been frequently in tho 
situation of a Polish diet, where a single VOTE has been sufficient to put a stop 
to all their movements. A sixtieth part of the Union, which is about the proportion 
of Delaware and Rhode Island, has several times been able to oppose an entire 
bar to its operations. 
THE FEDERALIST No. 22, at 121. 
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tion of the laws, to the protection of property against those irregu-
lar and high-handed combinations, which sometimes interrupt 
the ordinary course of justice, to the security of liberty against the 
enterprises and assaults of ambition, of faction, and of an-
archy.69 
ill. THE FRAMERS: PHILADELPHIA 1787 
95 
The Framers of the Constitution deliberated for four months, from May 
14 to September 17, 1787. Fifty-five men representing all of the states but 
Rhode Island attended at one point or another, though attendance aver-
aged forty or less. Of the twelve states represented, all did not vote on every 
motion, including some crucial to the evolution of war and treaty powers. 
The delegates acted in secret session as a Committee of the Whole, debat-
ing and voting on provisions section-by-section, each state having one vote 
and the majority ruling within both states' delegations and the Conven-
tion itself. Most of the actual drafting was done by smaller groups of 
influential delegates, for example, the five-man Committee on Detail10 
which in late July produced the first version of the Constitution actually 
written at the Convention. As noted before, the process was not conducive 
to a finely drawn, common "intent." 
Discussion of the Framers' debates concerning the division of war-peace 
authority between the President and Congress will be in two sections: first, 
a day-by-day account focusing on the powers to which the delegates gave 
most attention, war and treaty-making, and second, a summary statement 
of other pertinent debate. Why the day-by-day account? Because the Fra-
mers' action on war and treaty issues was not neat and compartmen-
talized, but episodic with heavy intermingling of distinct questions. Thus, 
their intentions .ue best approximated by tracking their steps in coming 
to the Constitution's language on war and treaty-making. 
Little progress on these matters was made from May through July. The 
Convention was then obsessed with dividing authority between the states 
69. THE FEDERALIST No. 70, at 384. It has been suggested that: 
In the late 1780's ... the trend toward weaker executives was reversed. The 
reversal, however, resulted from domestic considerations - stronger and more 
independent leadership seemed necessary to ensure liberty and stability \\ithin 
the country - and it had little or no connection with external problems of war-
making. 
Lofgren, supra note 10, at 697. See also G. WooD, THE CREATION OF TilE k!£RJCA.'''l REPUBUc 
1776-1787, at 393-564 (1969). 
70. The Committee on Detail was composed of Oliver Ellsworth (Conn.), Nathaniel Gor-
ham (Mass.), Edmund Randolph (Va.), John Rutledge (S.C.), and James Wilson (Po.). F. 
RoDELL, FmY-FivE MEN 121 (1936). 
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and national government and, within Congress, between the large and 
small states. And the Framers were beset with decisions about the basics 
of the national executive, among them whether it should be a legislative 
creature. With rare exception, the Philadelphia delegates seem to have 
assumed through July that legislators, as in Confederation days, would 
control all foreign concerns. 
After the emergence of the Senate as a body acceptable to the small 
states and endowed with a size, tenure, and continuity thought conducive 
to diplomatic power, strong August tides developed to commit American 
foreign affairs, epitomized by treaty-making, to the senators alone. As the 
month wore on, however, many of the Framers began to fear an overween-
ing Senate and to cast about for checks on its authority, as well as for 
checks on the power of Congress as a whole. Their remedy, adopted in a 
burst of early September activity, was a stronger Executive, one associated 
with the Senate in foreign negotiations and agreements. Thus, the Presi-
dent became part of the treaty-making process only ten days before the end 
of the Convention, over three and a half months after it began its work. 
A. War and Treaty-Making 
1. Philadelphia, May through July 
On May 29, 1787, the first substantive proposals were laid before the 
Convention. William Randolph presented the Virginia Plan. It made no 
specific reference to foreign or military affairs, and ducked legislative ver-
sus executive issues. It is likely that the Virginians saw few if any such 
issues. The national executive that they proposed was essentially a legisla-
tive agent, and almost certainly they expected policy-making to remain a 
congressional preserve, as had been the case since Independence. 
The Virginia Plan was eliptical. Its sixth resolution proposed simply that 
"the National Legislature ought to be empowered to enjoy the Legislative 
Rights vested in Congress by the Confederation, and moreover . . . to call 
forth the force of the Union agst. any member of the Union failing to fulfill 
its duty under the articles thereof'; and its seventh resolution suggested a 
national executive of unspecified number, to be elected by the legislature, 
who "beside a general authority to execute the National Laws ... ought 
to enjoy the Executive Rights vested in Congress by the Confederation."71 
As debate three days later made clear, these "Executive Rights" were not 
thought to cover war and treaty-making.72 
71. 1 FARRAND 21. See also 3 id. at 593-94. 
72. See text at notes 75 & 76 infra. 
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Following Randolph's speech, Charles Pinckney of South Carolina pre-
sented his own, more detailed constitutional scheme. What he actually 
said is uncertain. The account that Pinckney produced in 1819 for publica-
tion differs in certain respects from views that he himself expressed during 
and immediately after the Convention, and it resembles results later 
reached by the delegates only after much effort.73 Nonetheless, the Pinck-
ney Plan as recalled in 1819 vested in Congress power to raise, support and 
organize the military; in the Senate, authority over war, treaties and diplo-
matic appointments; and in the President the executive power and mili-
tary command. Articles seven and eight of the plan provided that "[t]he 
Senate shall have the sole & exclusive power to declare War & to make 
treaties & to appoint Ambassadors & other Ministers to Foreign nations," 
and that "[t]he Executive Power . . . shall be vested in a President," who 
"shall be Commander in chief of the army & navy of the United States & 
of the Militia of the several states. " 74 Pinckney did not explain "The Exec-
utive Power," but it could have had little foreign-affairs content, given the 
authority that he assigned the Senate. His proposals were referred to the 
Committee of the Whole, but never debated. The Viriginia Plan became 
the first focus of Convention discussion. 
On June 1, the Framers took up the seventh, or executive, resolution of 
the Virginia proposals. During argument whether the Executive should be 
one or several persons, discussion turned to which branch ought to govern 
war and peace. Even those favoring a strong executive opted for legislative 
control: 
Mr. Pinkney was for a vigorous Executive but was afraid the 
Executive powers of [the existing] Congress might extend to 
peace & war & which would render the Executive a Monarchy, 
of the worst kind, towit an elective one. 
Mr. Rutlidge ... was for vesting the Executive power in a 
single person, tho' he was not for giving him the power of war and 
peace. A single man would feel the greatest responsibility, and 
administer the public affairs best. 
73. See text at note 5 supra. As "reconstructed" by Max Farrand, Pinckney's May 29 
proposals dealt very little with executive-legislative relations, centering rather on federal-
state problems. It appears that Pinckney gave war and treaty-making to the legislature, 
because he called for "The Assent of Two-Thirds of both Houses where the present Confedera-
tion had made the assent of Nine States necessary." He named the President "Commander 
in chief of the Land Forces of the U.S. and Admiral of their Navy," authorized him "to 
inspect the Department of foreign Affairs-War-Treasury," to "suspend Officers, civil and 
military" and "to advise with the Heads of the different Departments as his Council." The 
legislatures, however, was to "institute offices and appoint officers for the Departments of 
For. Affairs, War, Treasury and Admiralty," and to control raising, supporting and organizing 
the military. 3 FARRAND 604-09. 
74. 1 FARRAND 23; 3 id. at 599-600. 
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Mr. Wilson preferred a single magistrate, as giving most energy 
dispatch and responsibility to the office. He did not consider the 
Prerogatives of the British Monarch as a proper guide in defining 
the Executive powers. Some of these prerogatives were of a Legis-
lative nature. Among others that of war & peace &c. The only 
powers he conceived strictly Executive were those of executing 
the laws, and appointing officers . . . . 7s 
According to the convention notes of Rufus King, Madison joined Wilson: 
Mad: agrees wth. Wilson in his definition of executive powers 
- executive powers ex vi termini, do not include the Rights of 
war & peace & c. but the powers shd. be confined and defined -
if large we shall have the evils of elective Monarchies - probably 
the best plan will be a single Executive of long duration wth. 
a Council, with liberty to depart from their opinion at his 
peril-76 
Others, such as Roger Sherman, did not confront war-power problems, as 
they viewed "the Executive magistracy as nothing more than an institu-
tion for carrying the will of the Legislature into effect, that the person or 
persons ought to be appointed by and accountable to the Legislature only, 
which was the depositary of the supreme will of the Society."77 
Agreement that war and peace policy were for the legislature, however, 
did not mean that the Convention felt that the legislators should direct a 
conflict, once authorized. The need for a single executive as commander-
in-chief was stressed by Pierce Butler on June 2 and Elbridge Gerry two 
days later. Butler said that 
his opinion on this point had been formed under the opportunity 
he had had of seeing the manner in which a plurality of military 
heads distracted Holland when threatened with invasion by the 
imperial troops. One man was for directing the force to the def-
ence of this part, another to that part of the Country, just as he 
happened to be swayed by prejudice or interest.78 
As for Gerry, he 
was at a loss to discover the policy of three members for the 
Executive. It wd. be extremely inconvenient in many instances, 
75. 1 FARRAND 64-66. See also id. at 73-74. Randolph "strenuously opposed a unity in tho 
Executive magistracy. He regarded it as the foetus of monarchy . . . . He could not see why 
the great requisites for the Executive department, vigor, despatch & responsibility could not 
be found in three men, as well as in one man." !d. at 66. 
76. 1 FARRAND 70. Madison's own account focused on the need to define the nature of 
executive power before settling on a single or plural Executive. !d. at 66-67. 
77. 1 FARRAND 65. 
78. 1 FARRAND 88-89. 
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particularly in military matters, whether relating to the militia, 
an army, or a navy. It would be a general with three heads.7~ 
99 
On June 15, William Patterson presented the New Jersey Plan, the small 
state reaction to the Virginia proposals. As was true with the Virginia Plan, 
no mention was made of foreign or military policy, though it seems clear 
that legislative control was assumed, in light of Confederation practice 
favored by the small states and in the light of the June 1 calls, just de-
scribed, for legislative control of war and peace. New Jersey's second prop-
osition left to the legislature "the powers vested in the U. States in Con-
gress, by the present existing articles of Confederation."!O Patterson also 
proposed a multiple executive, who would be commander-in-chief but 
might not take field command of American armies: 
[T]he Executives besides their general authority to execute the 
federal acts ought to appoint all federal officers not otherwise 
provided for, & to direct all military operations; provided that 
none of the persons [composing the federal Executive] shall on 
any occasion take command of any troops, so as personally con-
duct any enterprise as General, or in other capacity." 
Three days after Patterson spoke, Alexander Hamilton on June 18 ad-
vanced a starkly different view of the Executive. His "Governour" would 
have had extensive sway over foreign and military affairs through his "sole 
appointment of the heads ... of the departments of Finance, War and 
Foreign Affairs," and he would have made treaties "with the advice and 
approbation of the Senate." But even Hamilton did not propose that the 
"Governour" control the commitment of American forces to combat. 
Rather the Senate was to have that power, and the Executive only the 
authority to wage the conflict. The fourth and sixth provisos in his plan 
stated that: 
IV. The supreme Executive authority ... to be vested in a 
Govemour to be elected to serve during good behaviour . . . . 
The . . . functions of the Executive to be as follows: . . . to have 
the direction of war when authorized or begun; to have with the 
advice and approbation of the Senate the power of making all 
treaties; to have the sole appointment of the heads . . . of the 
departments of Finance War and Foreign Affairs . . . . 
VI. The Senate to have the sole power of declaring war, the 
power of advising and approving all Treaties, the power of ap-
79. 1 FARRAND 97. 
80. 1 FARRAND 243. 
81. 1 FARRAND 244. Although several versions of the New Jersey Plan exist, with significant 
differences among them, none of the variations bear on the war powers. See 3 id. at 611-16. 
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proving or rejecting all appointments of officers except the heads 
. . . of Finance War and foreign affairs. 82 
Note the apparent interchangeability with which Hamilton used the terms 
"declare" and "authorized or begun." He said the Senate was to "declare" 
war and the Executive to direct it once "authorized or begun." 
Hamilton and his Governour were ignored. There was no dissent on June 
26 when James Wilson, himself an advocate of potent executive authority, 
said that the Senate - not the Executive - "will probably be the deposi-
tory of the powers" regarding "foreign nations." Wilson was arguing the 
need for continuity in external relations to support a nine-year term for 
senators, with triennial rotation of one-third their number: 
Every nation may be regarded in two relations: 1) to its own 
citizens, 2) to foreign nations. It is therefore not only liable to 
anarchy and tyranny within but has wars to avoid and treaties 
to obtain from abroad. The Senate will probably be the deposi-
tory of the powers concerning the latter objects. It ought, there-
fore, to be made respectable in the eyes of foreign nations.83 
More than two months after the Convention first met, the Framers found 
time to pass a resolution dealing with the scope of legislative authority. It 
was akin to the Virginia proposal of May 29: 
[T]he national Legislature ought to possess the legislative rights 
vested in Congress by the confederation; and moreover to legis-
late in all cases from the general interests of the Union, and also 
in those cases in which the States are separately incompetent, or 
in which the harmony of the United States may be interrupted 
by the exercise of individuallegislation.84 
On July 26, the Convention adopted a resolution on the Executive, provid-
ing niggardly that one "be instituted to consist of a single person to be 
chosen by the national Legislature . . . with power to carry into execution 
82. 1 FARRAND 292. Robert Yates' account of Hamilton's proposal stated that: 
The executive to have the power of negativing all laws - to make war or pence, 
with the advice of the senate - to make treaties with their advice, but to have 
the sole direction of all military operations, and to send ambassadors and appoint 
all military officiers, and to pardon all offenders, treason excepted, unless by 
advice of the Senate. 
!d. at 300. It appears, however, that Yates erroneously included the Executive with the Senate 
in war-making decisions. The proposal that Hamilton submitted to Madison near the end of 
the Convention, like Madison's notes of Hamilton's June 18 speech, left these decisions to 
the Senate. See 3 id. at 622, 624-25. 
83. 1 FARRAND 426. 
84. 2 FARRAND 14, 21. See also 2 id. at 131-32. 
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the national Laws [and] to appoint to Offices in cases not otherwise 
provided for."85 
With these skimpy guides and the background of prior debate, the small 
Committee on Detail was left to work out the allocation of war and treaty 
powers, as part of their larger mandate to draft a proposed constitution. 
The Convention as a whole recessed on July 26 pending the Committee's 
report two weeks later. The fact that the Committee was able to move with 
ease to an allocation suggests the existence of general, if largely unspoken, 
consensus about the appropriate division: policy-making to the legislators 
and policy-implementation to the Executive. 
2. Philadelphia, August 
On August 6, John Rutledge reported for the Committee on Detail. A 
two-house legislature was proposed, with the treaty-making authority 
taken from the whole and given to the more elite of the new houses. One 
article stated that "The Senate . . . shall have power to make treaties, and 
to appoint Ambassadors .... "86 And the Committee report gave to the 
legislature the power "to make war," among other military grants. Pro-
posed Article VII provided: 
Sect. 1. The Legislature of the United States shall have the 
power ... 
To make rules concerning captures on land and water; 
To declare the law and punishment of piracies and felonies 
committed on the high seas, . . . and of offences against the law 
of nations; 
To subdue a rebellion in any State, on the application of its 
legislature; 
To make war; 
To raise armies; 
To build and equip fleets; 
To call forth the aid of the militia, in order to execute the laws 
of the Union, enforce treaties, supress insurrections, and repel 
• • 87 
mvaswns .... 
The Committee also proposed a single Executive who "shall be com-
mander in chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the 
Militia of the Several States."88 
The Convention began consideration of the constitution as proposed, 
85. 2 FARRAND 116. See also 2 id. at 132. 
86. 2 FARRAND 183. 
87. 2 FARRAND 181-82. 
88. 2 FARRAND 185. 
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moving clause-by-clause. On August 11, a proviso for publication oflegisla-
tive debates was reached, with some suggestion that the Senate might act 
in a non-legislative capacity requiring greater secrecy than ordinary, and 
that questions of war and peace should be considered in camera. Advocates 
of complete public disclosure, however, prevailed for the moment: 
Mr. (Madison) & Mr. Rutlidge moved "that each House shall 
keep a journal of its proceeding, & (shall) publish the same from 
time to time; except such (part) of the proceedings of the Senate, 
when acting not in its Legislative capacity as may (be judged by) 
that House (to) require secrecy." 
Mr. Mercer. This implies that other powers than legislative will 
be given to the Senate which he hoped would not be given.89 
The motion then failed, with Virginia alone in favor. At which point 
Messrs. Gerry and Sherman moved "to insert after the words 'publish 
them' the following 'except such as relate to treaties & military operations.' 
Their object was to give each House a discretion in such cases." Their 
motion was also unsuccessful. 90 
Two days later, on August 13, foreign affairs surfaced again amid debate 
over the sole authority of the House of Representatives to initiate revenue 
measures. James Wilson joined those opposing any such prerogative for the 
House. "War, Commerce & Revenue were the great objects of the Genl. 
Government," he said. "All of them are connected with money. There-
striction in favor of the H. of Represets. would exclude the Senate from 
originating any important bills whatever -"91 Edmund Randolph, how-
ever, felt strongly that money - "the means of war" - as well as actual 
decisions to fight, should be dominated by the House: 
When the people behold in the Senate, the countenance of an 
aristocracy; and in the president, the form at least of a little 
monarch, will not their alarms be sufficiently raised without tak-
ing from their immediate representatives, a right which has been 
so long appropriated to them. - The Executive will have more 
89. 2 FARRAND 259. 
90. 2 FARRAND 260. The Framers ultimately provided in Article I of the Constitution that 
"Each House shall keep a Journal of its Proceedings, and from time to time publish the same, 
excepting such parts as may in their Judgment require Secrecy." U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 5. 
Concern over congressional secrecy, however, remained at high pitch, and three states- New 
York, Rhode Island, and Virginia - ratified the Constitution with a request that it be 
amended to permit only the withholding of sensitive diplomatic and military information. 
Had the first North Carolina convention agreed to the Constitution, it very likely would have 
sought the same amendment. See 1 ELLIOT 330 (N.Y.), 336 (R.I.); 3 id. at 659-60 (Va.); 4 id. 
at 245 (N.C.). See generally note 175 infra and accompanying text. 
91. 2 FARRAND 275. 
1974] WAR POWERS Au.OCATION 
influence over the Senate, than over the H. of Reps - Allow the 
Senate to originate in this case, & that influence will be sure to 
mix itself in their deliberations and plans. The Declaration of 
War he conceived ought not to be in the Senate composed of 26 
men only, but rather in the other House. In the other House ought 
to be placed the origination of the means of war . . . . The Sen-
ate will be more likely to be corrupt than the H. of Reps and 
should therefore have less to do with money matters.n 
103 
On August 15, there was a flurry over the treaty power, again during 
controversy over the Representatives' fiscal prerogatives. George Mason 
was "extremely earnest" to prevent initiation of money bills by the Senate, 
"who he said could already sell the whole Country by means ofTreaties." 
He suggested that "[i]f Spain should possess herself of Georgia therefore 
the Senate might by treaty dismember the Union."Pl Responding to 
Mason, John Francis Mercer of Maryland suddenly broke with prevailing 
opinion to oppose treaty-making by the Senate rather than the Executive, 
though with the debilitating proviso that treaties required congressional 
ratification before becoming law. Mercer felt "that the Senate ought not 
to have the power of treaties. This power belonged to the Executive depart-
ment; adding that Treaties would not be final so as to alter the laws of the 
land, till ratified by legislative authority," citing British precedent.u But 
his comment prompted no other expressions of support for executive 
treaty-making. 
On August 17 the Convention reached its most celebrated war-power 
moment: the substitution of "declare" for "make" in what became the 
congressional declaration-of-war clause. The recorded debate in its various 
versions, however, is anticlimatic. It covers only a few pages, with conflict 
between the accounts of Jackson and Madison. While confusing and poten-
tially unreliable on the crucial issue of executive authority, Madison's 
notes provide the only substantial coverage of the Framers' thoughts. 
Charles Pinckney began the debate with an objection to placing war-
commencement authority in Congress as a whole, on the ground that the 
House of Representatives was institutionally incapable of handling it well. 
He preferred the Senate alone, noting that the States are equally repre-
sented there and that the Senators, as was still the case at that stage of 
the Convention, had sole authority over the making of peace treaties: 
Mr. Pinkney opposed the vesting this power in the Legislature. 
92. 2 FARRAND 278-79. Randolph said that he opposed Senate involvement as much to help 
win ratification of the Constitution, as to ensure sound government: "His principal object \Yns 
to prevent popular objections against the plan, and to secure its adoption." /d. at 279. 
93. 2 FARRAND 297-98. 
94. 2 FARRAND 297. 
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Its proceedings were too slow. It wd. meet but once a year. The 
Hs. of Reps would be too numerous for such deliberations. The 
Senate would be the best depositary, being more acquainted with 
foreign affairs, and most capable of proper resolutions. If the 
States are equally represented in the Senate, so as to give no 
advantage to large States, the power will notwithstanding be 
safe, as the small have their all at stake in such cases as well as 
the large States. It would be singular for one- authority to make 
war, and another peace.95 
Pierce Butler then pushed argument as to institutional advantages one 
step further, proposing that war commencement be left to the judgment 
of the most rapid, expert and national of all, the President: 
The Objections agst the Legislature [noted by Pinckney] lie in 
a great degree agst the Senate. He was for vesting the power in 
the President, who will have all the requisite qualities, and will 
not make war but when the Nation will support it.98 
Butler's suggestion is the only recorded proposal by either a Framer or 
Ratifier that the Executive control war-making. Butler never formally so 
moved. Further, as we shall see, he claimed no credit for the proposal when 
describing it to the South Carolina ratification convention, and by Sep· 
tember 7 he had harsh words for executive good faith. Several Philadelphia 
delegates expresssly attacked his proposal, as noted below. 
After Butler spoke, Madison, seconded by Gerry, made his famed "sud-
den attack" motion. It did not refer to executive authority to repel immi-
nent, as well as ongoing attack, even though authority over both was given 
to the states by explicit language in the August 6 draft constitution. The 
motion, nonetheless, did seem to intend greater emergency authority for 
the President than had been proposed for him to that point: 
Mr. M(adison) and Mr. Gerry moved to insert "declare," strik-
ing out "make" war; leaving to the Executive the power to repel 
sudden attacks. 97 
95. 2 FARRAND 318. Compare Pinckney's memory in 1818 of his Convention position on 
senatorial war-making: 
It may be necessary to remark that very soon after the Convention met I changed 
& avowed candidly the change of my opinion . . . in giving the exclusive Power 
to the Senate to declare War thinking it safer ... to vest [war-making] in 
Congress. 
3 Id. at 427-28 (letter to John Quincy Adams, Dec. 30, 1818). 
96. 2 FARRAND 318. Butler's commitment of war to the Executive seems to have been a 
passing fancy. Compare his comments, 2 id. at 541 and 4 ELLIOT 263. 
97. 2 FARRAND 318. 
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What happened thereafter none can say with confidence. Both the Jack-
son and Madison accounts agree that the substitution of "declare" for 
"make" ultimately passed eight states to one; but Jackson recorded the 
motion as having been initially defeated five to four, while Madison re-
ported that it first passed seven to two, and then became eight to one when 
Oliver Ellsworth of Connecticut "gave up his objection," thus shifting his 
state's vote from no to yes.ss In Madison's version, Messrs. Sherman, 
Gerry, Ellsworth, and Mason all spoke before the first vote was taken. 
Their remarks as recorded did little to lessen the confusion. 
Sherman seemed to think that the President already had authority to 
repel sudden attacks under the Committee of Detail language, and that 
adoption of the motion might unduly narrow congressional authority: 
Mr. Sharman thought it stood very well. The Executive shd. 
be able to repel and not to commence war. "Make" better than 
"declare" the latter narrowing the power too much.v3 
Gerry, apparently ignoring Sherman's attack on the motion that he had 
just seconded, turned to attack Butler for having suggested that the Presi-
dent be empowered to make war: 
Mr. Gerry never expected to hear in a republic a motion to 
empower the Executive alone to declare war.lco 
Ellsworth then gained the floor for reasons best known to him. Perhaps 
he wished to rebut Pinckney's view that the Senate should control war 
because it controlled peace: 
Mr. Elseworth. there is a material difference between the cases 
of making war, and making peace. It shd. be more easy to get out 
of war, than into it. War also is a simple and overt declaration. 
peace attended with intricate & secret negociations. 101 
98. Compare 2 FARRAND (Jackson) with 2 id. at 319 (Madison). The only other notes extant 
on the make-to-declare debate, those of James McHeruy, odd little. They tersely state: 
Debated the difference between a power to declare war, and to make war -
amended by substituting declare- adjourned without a question on the clause. 
2 Id. at 320. According to Jackson, however, there was a vote on the clause, and the Com·en-
tion did not again consider the declaration of war language. 
99. 2 FARRAND 318. 
100. 2 FARRAND 318. Though Gerry referred to an executive war-making "motion," neither 
Jackson, Madison or McHeruy cited one. Conceivably the motion was mode, and the first 
vote mentioned by Jackson was devoted to its defeat. Such, however, is sheer speculation. 
Given the Framers' fear of executive power, it borders on the inconceivable that an executive 
war-making motion could have failed only five states to four- the vote recorded by Jackson 
for the first motion - or that Madison could hove failed to notice both the making of so 
explosive a motion and its rejection by only a razor's edge. 
101. 2 FARRAND 319. 
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What exactly Ellsworth thought of the sudden-&ttack motion, on which he 
is recorded by Madison as having first voted no and then yes, is lost to 
time. 
Then came George Mason with warnings against executive or senatorial 
war-making and his famed plea for "clogging" war and facilitating peace. 
The tenor of Mason's remarks would seem to place him with Sherman in 
opposition to the sudden-attack motion but for reasons also lost to time 
he must have believed that changing "make-to-declare" would lessen the 
likelihood of American involvement in hostilities: 
Mr. Mason was agst giving the power of war to the Executive, 
because not (safely) to be trusted with it; or to the Senate, be-
cause not so constructed as to entitled to it. He was for clogging 
rather than facilitating war; but for facilitating peace. He pre-
ferred "declare" to "make". 102 
At this juncture, Madison records a favorable vote on the motion. It may 
or may not have been favorable. He then indicates that Rufus King pointed 
out "that 'make' war might be understood to 'conduct' it which was an 
Executive function." 103 According to Madison, this argument led Ellsworth 
to drop his objection to "declare," altering Connecticut's vote and produc-
ing an 8-to-1 approval. If that was what happened, it seems that a majority 
of the Framers voted for "declare" to give the President authority to re-
spond to sudden attacks, only Ellsworth going along to ensure that con-
gressional authority would not be thought to extend to conducting war. If, 
however, Jackson correctly noted a defeat for the sudden-attack motion on 
its first try, and if King's argument was the decisive factor in the changed 
vote, then a majority of the Framers may well have preferred "declare" to 
avoid suggesting that Congress controls the conduct as well as the authori-
zation of conflict. 
The inconclusive records of the Philadelphia debate on changing 
"make" to "declare" are not sharpened by available accounts of the ratifi-
cation debates. The one remark made during the state debates that was 
at least tangentially relevant to the Framers' war-power intent came from 
none other than Pierce Butler, the man who had favored presidential con-
trol. On January 16, 1788, he "endeavor[ed] to recollect" for his fellow 
delegates to the South Carolina convention "those reasons by which [the 
102. 2 FARRAND 319. Perhaps Mason believed that heightened national capacity to repel 
sudden attack, via executive emergency authority, would deter foreign aggressors. Judging 
by his distaste for executive military power, it is reasonable to assume that Mason did not 
understand make-to-declare as granting sweeping presidential prerogative. See, e.g., 3 ELLIOT 
496-98. 
103. 2 FARRAND 319. Madison's notes state only that "[o]nly the remark by Mr. King that 
'make' war might be understood to 'conduct' it which was an Executive function, Mr. Else-
worth gave up his objection (and the vote of Cont was changed to- ay.)" !d. (textual note). 
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Framers] were guided." But his explanation was only casually related to 
the debate as recorded by Madison and wholly ignored the sudden-attack 
motion. Butler recalled: 
It was first proposed to vest the sole power of making peace or 
war in the Senate; but this was objected to as inimical to the 
genius of a republic, by destroying the necessary balance they 
were anxious to preserve. Some gentlemen were inclined to give 
this power to the President; but it was objected to, as throwing 
into his hands the influence of a monarch, having an opportunity 
of involving his country in a war whenever he wished to promote 
her destruction. The House of Representatives was then named; 
but an insurmountable objection was made to this proposition 
-which was, that negotiations always required the greatest se-
crecy, which could not be expected in a large body.l01 
Thus, despite its immense significance to post-1789 practice, the Fra-
mers' make-to-declare debate scarcely concerned the Constitutional Fa-
thers. Perspective on this debate's limited utility for judgment about the 
Framers' war-peace intentions also stems from the fact that four of the 
thirteen states took no part in it. Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York 
and Rhode Island had no "intent" at all on the substitution of "declare" 
for "make. " 1os 
104. 4 Ewor 263. See also note 96 supra. Note that Butler spoke of the "power of making 
peace or war," despite the make·to·declare substitution. Ezra Stiles marked his diary for 
December 21, 1789 in the same vein: 
Mr. Baldwin was one of the Continental Convention at Philada last Summer. He 
gave me an Acct of the whole Progress in Convention. It appeared that they were 
pretty unanimous in the followg Ideas, viz . . . • 10. They vested Congress • . . 
with the Army, Navy & makg War & Peace. 
3 FARRAND 168·69. 
It is significant, further, that Butler's remarks did not occur during debate on the 
executive-legislative allocation of war powers, or even during consideration of congressional 
authority to declare war. He was responding, instead, to fear that the Senate would be 
overweeningly powerful, because its members could not be impeached. Judge Pendleton had 
just "read a paragraph in the Constitution, which says 'the Senate shall have the sole power 
of impeachment,'" and said: 
In the British government, and all governments where power is given to make 
treaties of peace, or declare war, there had been found necessity to annex responsi-
bility. In England, particularly, ministers that advised illegal measures v:ere lia-
ble to impeachment, for advising the King. Now, if justice called for punishment 
of treachery in the Senate, on account of giving bad advice, before what tribunal 
could they be arraigned? Not surely before their house; that was absurd to sup-
pose. Nor could the President be impeached for making treaties, he acting only 
under the advice of Senate, without power of negativing. 
4 Ewor 263. 
105. Madison recorded: "On the motion to insert declare- in place of Make, (it was agreed 
108 VIRGINIA JoURNAL oF INTERNATIONAL LAw [VoL. 15:1 
Action on war and peace continued on August 17, immediately after the 
substitution debate. Pinckney's effort to strike the whole declare-war 
clause failed, with no record of argument. Concern heard on August 15 
about possible senatorial venality in peace-making was renewed by Gerry, 
when Butler tried to put the power over war and peace in the same hands, 
those of Congress as a whole: 
Mr. Butler moved to give the Legislature power of peace, as 
they were to have that of war. 
Mr. Gerry 2ds. him. 8 Senators may possibly exercise the power 
if vested in that body, and 14 if all should be present; and may 
consequently give up part of the U. States. The Senate are more 
liable to be corrupted by an Enemy than the whole Legislature.100 
The motion for adding "and peace" after "war," however, failed ten states 
to none, Massachusetts having returned to vote. 107 
On August 18 marque and reprisal were mentioned in passing for the 
first time, among a list of additional legislative powers for consideration 
by the Convention. Madison's notes suggest that Pinckney prepared the 
list, but also state that Gerry "remarked that ... something (ought to be) 
inserted concerning letters of marque, which he thought not included in 
the power of war."108 Marque and reprisal were within congressional au-
thority under the Articles of Confederation; the Framers doubtless felt it 
natural that similar authority be given Congress under the Constitution. 
·Gerry's concern, perhaps, was rooted in the fact that the Articles permitted 
Congress to authorize marque and reprisal "in times of peace," as well as 
war. 109 It suggests a desire to make absolutely clear congressional control 
to.) N.H. no. Mas. abst. Cont. no.* Pa. ay. Del. ay. Md. ay. Va. ay. N.C. ay. S.C. ay. Geo. 
ay." 2 FARRAND 319. The asterisk by Connecticut's vote refers to Madison's footnote, quoted 
in note 103 supra, indicating that with Ellsworth's change of heart "the vote of Cont was 
changed to- ay." 
106. 2 FARRAND 319. 
107. 2 FARRAND 319. 
108. 1 FARRAND 326. See also id. at 322. 
109. Although the Articles did not explicitly state that Congress might grant letter of 
marque and reprisal during war, the grant to Congress of broad authority over hostilities, and 
the proviso for state marque and reprisal during war, under congressional supervision, indl· 
cate the existence of the power. See ART. OF CoNFED. arts. VI & IX, supra note 28, Madison 
similarly understood congressional power over marque under the Articles of Confederation: 
The prohibition of letters of marque is another part of the old system, but is 
somewhat extended in the new. According to the former, letters of marque could 
be granted by the States after a declaration of war; according to the latter, these 
licenses must be obtained as well during war as previous to its declaration, from 
the government of the United States. This alteration is fully justified by the 
advantage of uniformity in all points which relate to foreign powers; and of imme· 
diate responsibility to the nation in all those for whose conduct the nation itself 
is to be responsible. 
THE FEDERALIST No. 44, at 247. 
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over minor as well as major uses of American armed force. 
Two days later, on August 20, Gouverneur Morris struck a blow for 
executive prerogative reminiscent of Hamilton's effort on June 18.110 Morris 
urged a presidential "Council of State," consisting of the Chief Justice and 
the Secretaries of Domestic Affairs, Commerce and Finance, Foreign Af-
fairs, War and the Marine. The secretaries were to "be appointed by the 
President and bold office during pleasure," though subject to impeach-
ment. The duties of the Secretary of Foreign Affairs implied executive 
control of American diplomacy. Significantly, the President would not 
have bad to follow the advice given him by the Council. Charles Pinckney, 
departing his heavy senatorial bias, found merit in the proposal: 
Mr. Govr. Morris 2ded. by Mr. Pinckney submitted the follow-
ing propositions which were in like manner referred to the Com-
mittee on Detail. 
"To assist the President in conducting the Public affairs there 
shall be a Council of State composed of the following officers -
4. The Secretary of foreign affairs who shall also be appointed 
by the President during pleasure. It shall be his duty to corre-
spond with all foreign Ministers, prepare plans of Treaties, & 
consider such as may be transmitted from abroad; and generally 
to attend to the interests of the U- S- in their connections with 
foreign powers. 
5. The Secretary of War who shall also be appointed by the 
President during pleasure. It shall be his duty to superintend 
every thing relating to the war-Department, such as the raising 
and equipping of troops, the care of military Stores -public forti-
fications, arsenals & the like - also in time of war to prepare & 
recommend plans of offence and Defence. 
The President may from time to time submit any matter to the 
discussion of the Council of State, and he may require the written 
opinions of any one or more of the members: But he shall in all 
cases exercise his own judgment, and either Conform to such 
opinions or not as be may think proper; and every officer above-
mentioned shall be responsible for his opinion of the affairs relat-
ing to his particular Department."111 
110. See text following note 81 supra. 
111. 2 FARRAND 342-44. Morris had earlier commented that: 
There must be certain great officers of State; a minister of finance, of war, 
of foreign affairs &c. These he presumes will exercise their functions in 
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Morris' plan was submitted to the Committee on Detail, where it was 
shredded. His aspirations for the President, like those of Hamilton before 
him, were not shared by their colleagues. The Committee in its August 22 
report denied constitutional status to the various secretaries, leaving their 
existence subject to legislation; it said nothing about their duties, again 
leaving their definition to statute and practice; and it took control over the 
appointment of these officers from the President: 
The Committee report that in their opinion the following addi-
tions should be made to the report now before the Convention vizt 
The President . . . shall have a Privy-Council which shall con-
sist of the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House 
... , the Chief-Justice ... and the principal Officer in the 
respective departments of foreign affairs, domestic affairs, War, 
Marine, and Finance, as such departments of office shall from 
time to time be established - whose duty it shall be to advise 
him in matters respecting the execution of his Office, which he 
shall think proper to lay before them: But their advice shall not 
conclude him, nor affect his responsibility for the measures which 
he shall adopt. 112 
Whether the President should have a council, and the extent of its power 
over him, remained burning issues for the rest of the Convention. The tenor 
of debate, however, was one of checking presidential prerogative, not en-
hancing it, through a council. Ultimately, of course, the Framers opted for 
no privy advisers other than the Senate and for an innocuous proviso that 
the Executive "may require the Opinion in writing, of the principal Officer 
in each of the executive Departments, upon any Subject relating to the 
Duties of their respective Offices." 113 
subordination to the Executive, and will be amenable by impeachment to the 
public Justice. Without these ministers the Executive can do nothing of conse-
quence. 
!d. at 53-54. 
112. 2 FARRAND 366-67. 
113. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2. Discussion of an executive council recurred periodically, often 
with a foreign affairs cast and even more frequently with an aura of executive restraint. As 
George Mason said when it became clear that there would be no advisers other than the 
Senate: "[I)n rejecting a Council to the President we were about to try an experiment on 
which the most despotic Governments had never ventured- The Gmnd Signor himself had 
his Divan." 2 FARRAND 541. See, e.g., 1 id. at 21 (Resolution 8 of the Virginia Plan), 74 
(Randolph), 97 (Sherman & Gerry); 2 id. at 328-29, 342-44 (Morris and Pinckney's proposed 
"Council of State"), 542 (Franklin); 3 id. at 606 (Article III of the Pinckney Plan). James 
Iredell also made a lengthy council comment before the North Carolina convention. 4 ELLIOT 
108-10. 
It appears, however, that the Framers viewed the Senate in certain of its functions as a 
potent executive council. E.g., 2 FARRAND 538-39. On the other hand, in Luther Martin's view 
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On August 23 the clause giving exclusive treaty power to the Senate 
came up for discussion. Reaction to the heady authority proposed for the 
senators set in. Madison wished to involve the President as "an agent" -
not the agent - in treaty-making, principally because the Senate repre-
sented only state interests: 
Mr. (Madison) observed that the Senate represented the States 
alone, and that for this as well as other obvious reasons it was 
proper that the President should be an agent in Treaties.111 
Gouverneur Morris was not certain that "he should agree to refer the 
making of Treaties to the Senate at all," but his remedy was to involve 
the House of Representatives by requiring that "no Treaty shall be binding 
on the U.S. which is not ratified by law."m His motion to this end failed, 
eight states opposed, Pennsylvania in favor and North Carolina divided. 
Arguments on Morris' motion strikingly evidenced what was on the Fra-
mers' minds. Madison felt that convenience demanded exclusion of the 
House from precisely those agreements with direct bearing on the use of 
force. He "suggested the inconvenience of requiring a legal ratification of 
treaties of alliance for the purposes of war &c &c,"m and later "hinted for 
consideration, whether a distinction might not be made between different 
sorts of Treaties - Allowing the President & Senate to make Treaties 
eventual and of Alliance for limited terms - and requiring the concurrence 
of the whole Legislature in other Treaties."117 
Nathaniel Gorham and Benjamin Franklin expected the Senate to con-
trol negotiations and worried about practical problems if the House were 
to be able to derail the senators' plans: 
Mr. Ghorum. Many other disadvantages must be experienced 
if treaties of peace and all negociations are to be previously rati-
fied - and if not previously, the Ministers would be at a loss how 
to proceed . . . . American Ministers must go abroad not in-
structed by the same Authority which is to ratify their proceed-
ings. 
Doer. Johnson thought there was something of solecism in say-
ing that the acts of a Minister with plenipotentiary powers from 
one Body should depend for ratification on another Body . . . .115 
the Senate would provide a spineless set of advisers to the President: "The impeachment can 
rarely come from the Second branch, who are his Council and will be under his inlluence." 3 
I d. at 158 (Address before Md. House of Rep., Nov. 29, 1787). 
114. 2 FARRAND 392. 
115. 2 FARRAND 392. 
116. 2 FARRAND 392. 
117. 2 FARRAND 394. 
118. 2 FARRAND 392-93. 
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Presumably when presidential involvement in treaty-making was later 
approved unanimously by the Convention, neither Gorham nor Johnson 
thought a "solecism" was created, because the Senate and President were 
expected to act jointly during negotiation and approval of agreements. 
Morris defended his motion on a number of ephemeral grounds, and was 
answered by the equally transient reasoning of Gorham: 
Mr. Govr. Morris. As to treaties of alliance, they will oblige 
foreign powers to send their Ministers here, the very thing we 
should wish for. Such treaties could not be otherwise made, if his 
amendment shd. succeed. In general he was not solicitous to mul-
tiply & facilitate Treaties. He wished none to be made with G. 
Britain, till she should be at war. Then a good bargain might be 
made with her. So with other foreign powers. The more difficulty 
in making treaties, the more value will be set on them. 
Mr. Ghorum in answer to Mr. Govr. Morris, said that negocia-
tions on the spot were not be desired by us, especially if the whole 
Legislature is to have any thing to do with Treaties. It will be 
generally influenced by two or three men, who will be corrupted 
by the Ambassadors here. In such a Government as ours, it is 
necessary to guard against the Government itself being se-
duced.119 
Finally, James Wilson suggested that the Morris amendment simply 
reflected British practice: "In the most important Treaties, the King . . . 
being obliged to resort to Parliament for the execution of them, is under 
the same fetters as the amendment ... will impose on the Senate."120 And 
John Dickinson, voicing the state-federal concern that ever underlay treaty 
debate, said that he "concurred in the amendment, as most safe and 
proper, tho' he was sensible it was unfavorable to the little States; wch 
would otherwise have an equal share in making Treaties."121 Amid this 
gaggle of views, the Framers decided to postpone action on treaties, except 
to reject Morris' motion for House ratification of Senate-made agreements. 
Before returning to the treaty power, the Convention on August 27 dis-
posed of the commander-in-chief clause with phenomenal rapidity, in light 
of its fundamental importance in later years. Recall that the Committee 
on Detail had proposed that the President's command run equally over 
"the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the Several 
States. " 122 The only recorded debate centered on this equality of command, 
119. 2 FARRAND 392-93. 
120. 2 FARRAND 393. 
121. 2 FARRAND 393. 
122. See text at note 88 supra. 
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with its suggestion of an undue federal hand on state troops: "Mr. Sher-
man moved to amend the clause giving the Executive the command of the 
Militia, so as to read 'and of the Militia of the several States, when called 
into the actual service of the U- S-.' " 1%3 The motion and clause so altered 
passed six states to two, with Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York and 
North Carolina not voting, and Rhode Island absent as always.•:• 
There may also have been brief debate over whether the President 
should be permitted to command in the field. One of the Framers, Luther 
Martin, reported to the Maryland legislature on November 29, 1787, that: 
Objections were made to that part of this article by which the 
President is appointed Commander-in-Chief . . . ; and it was 
wished to be so far restrained, that he should not command in 
person; but this could not be obtained.1%3 
As we have seen, too, the New Jersey Plan introduced on June 15 would 
have forbidden an Executive on horseback.116 
Thus, it seems that the only commander-in-chief concerns of the Con-
vention were undue federal authority over the militia and the possibility 
that executive field command might lead to tyranny. It is reasonable to 
assume that the commander-in-chief clause was noncontroversial because 
the Framers intended it to convey tightly circumscribed authority: that of 
first general and admiral of American forces, with power only to wage war 
authorized by Congress. 
3. Philadelphia, September 
On September 4, thirteen days before the end of the Convention, there 
came the first hard proposal that the President join the Senate in making 
treaties. David Brearley, speaking for the eleven-member Committee on 
Unfinished Business, 127 proposed that 
The President by and with the advice and Consent of the Sen-
ate, shall have power to make Treaties; . . . . But no Treaty 
shall be made without the consent of two thirds of the members 
present.128 
123. 2 FARRAND 426. 
124. 2 FARRAND 426-27. 
125. 3 FARRAND 217-18. 
126. See text at note 81 supra. 
127. The Committee on Unfinished Business was composed of one representative from each 
state attending the Convention: Nicholas Gilman (N.H.), Rufus King (Mass.), Roger Sher-
man (Conn.), David Brearley (N.J.), Gouverneur Morris (Pn.), John Dickinson (Del.), Daniel 
Carrol (Md.), James Madison (Va.), Hugh Wiiliamson (N.C.), Pierce Butler (S.C.), and 
Abraham Baldwin (Ga.). See 2 FARRAND 473. 
128. 2 FARRAND 498-99. 
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There was no further discussion of treaty-making on the fourth. 
On the following day, September 5, the Framers without debate unani-
mously accepted a further suggestion from the Committee on Unfinished 
Business "[T]o add to the clause 'to declare war' the words 'and grant 
letters of marque and reprisal.' " 129 This proved to be the last occasion on 
which the Convention allocated control between Congress and the Presi-
dent over the use of armed force. 
All that remained were questions concerning treaty-making, which 
themselves bore heavily on war and peace. A number of issues were in 
contention: whether the House of .Representatives should be joined with 
the Senate in making treaties, whether the President should be joined, by 
what majority the Senate was to act, and whether peace treaties should 
be treated like other pacts as regards the size of the Senate majority needed 
for approval, and the possibility that the Senate might override presiden-
tial objections. In short, to what degree was ·senatorial prerogative over 
foreign affairs to be tempered? 
The Framers turned first to House participation when they reached 
treaty-making on September 7. The August 23 effort to have the Repre-
sentatives included130 was renewed, and again decisively rejected, with 
scant debate. In Sherman's words, "the only question that could be made 
was whether the power could be safely trusted to the Senate. He thought 
it could; and the necessity of secrecy in the case of treaties forbade a 
reference of them to the whole Legislature."131 
The language leaving treaties to the Senate and President was then 
approved unanimously, without further debate.l32 Discussion centered on 
other language in that clause concerning executive-senatorial control over 
federal appointments. 
Belated but hard consensus had formed that the Executive should be 
joined in treaty-making with the Senate to guard the national interest. 
During later controversy over the size of the Senate majority required to 
approve treaties, Rufus King reminded his colleagues "that as the Execu-
tive was here joined in the business, there was a check which did not exist 
in [the Confederation] Congress where the concurrence of 2/3 was re-
quired,"133 and Gorham echoed that "[T]here is a difference in the case, 
as the President's consent will also be necessary in the new Govt."134 As 
Madison explained in 1831: "After the compromise which allowed an 
equality of votes in the Senate, that consideration, with the smaller num-
129. 2 FARRAND 505. 
130. See text following note 114 supra. 
131. 2 FARRAND 538. 
132. 2 FARRAND 538. 
133. 2 FARRAND 540. 
134. 2 FARRAND 549. 
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ber and longer tenure of its members, will account for abridgment of its 
powers by associating the Executive in the exercise of them. " 135 
Also influential, no doubt, was recognition that executive speed and 
secrecy could be useful during negotiations, and belief that no independent 
prerogative was being given the President, only association with the Sen-
ate. The Framers' prior debate leaves little doubt that they thought the 
Senate institutionally capable of handling the country's diplomatic busi-
ness. And against the background of British and colonial use of "advice 
and consent," 136 those words surely were intended to grant the Senate at 
least as plenary a role in treaty-making as the President. 
The rest of the treaty debate on September 7 went largely to the disposi-
tion of peace agreements. Madison first moved that two-thirds approval 
by the Senate be required for all pacts "'except treaties of peace' allowing 
these to be made with less difficulty than other treaties." His proposal to 
ease the way to peace was unanimously approved, without discussion. 131 
Madison then sought to cut back the presidential role in peace-making. 
He proposed that the Senate by two-thirds vote be allowed to make peace 
over the Executive's objection, lest he find war so conducive to personal 
power that he block its end: 
Mr. Madison ... moved to authorize a concurrence of two 
thirds of the Senate to make treaties of peace, without the con-
currence of the President." - The President he said would neces-
sarily derive so much power and importance from a state of war 
that he might be tempted, if authorized, to impede a treaty of 
peace.136 
Pierce Butler seconded the motion, in contrast to his August 17 suggestion 
135. 3 FARRAND 503. In Pinckney's letter of December 30, 1818, to John Quincy Adams on 
the Philadelphia proceedings, he described association of the President \\ith the Senate as a 
rash, twelfth-hour act: 
[T]he great power given to the President was never intended to have been given 
to him while the Convention continued in that patient & cooly delibernth'llsitua-
tion in which they had been for nearly the whole of the proceeding five months of 
their session, nor was it until within the last week or ten days that almost. the 
whole of the Executive Department was altered- I can ll9Sure you as a fact that 
for more than Four months & a half out of Five The power of exclusively making 
treaties, appointing public Ministers & Judges of the supreme Court was given 
to the Senate after numerous delegates & considerations of the subject both in 
Committee of the whole & in the house .... 
I d. at 427. In an 1831letter, James Madison took strong issue with Pinckney's memory, and 
explained presidential involvement in treaties and appointments as noted in the text. See 
id. at 502-03. 
136. See note 38 supra and accompanying text. 
137. 2 FARRAND 540. 
138. 2 FARRAND 540. 
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that the President be allowed to commence war on his own authority, 13~ 
adding "he will not make war but when the Nation will support it."140 
Messrs. Gorham and Morris demurred, arguing that the President could 
not carry on war opposed by the legislature, since it controlled the tools of 
conflict, and that the Executive, in any event, was himself the defender of 
the national interest: 
Mr. Ghorum thought the precaution unnecessary as the means 
of carrying on the war would not be in the hands of the President, 
but of the Legislature. 
Mr. Govr. Morris thought the power of the President in this 
case harmless; and no peace ought to be made without the con-
currence of the President, who was the general Guardian of the 
National interests. 141 
Butler supported his second. He 
was strenuous for the motion, as a necessary security against 
ambitious & corrupt Presidents. He mentioned the later perfi-
dious policy of the Statholder in Holland; and the artifices of the 
Duke of Marlbro' to prolong the war of which he had the manage-
ment.142 
Elbridge Gerry and Hugh Williamson then concluded the debate, appar-
ently harking back to Madison's first motion regarding a majority- rather 
than two-thirds - Senate approval of peace. These Framers saw a greater 
threat in ending wars on disadvantageous terms, than in extending them 
for lack of a two-thirds vote for peace: 
Mr. Gerry was of opinion that in treaties of peace a greater 
rather than less proportion of votes was necessary, than in other 
treaties. In Treaties of peace the dearest interests will be at stake, 
as the fisheries, territories &c. In treaties of peace also there is 
more danger to the extremities of the Continent, of being sacri-
ficed, than on any other occasions. 
Mr. Williamson thought Treaties of Peace should be guarded 
at least by requiring the same concurrence as in other Treaties. 143 
139. See text at note 96 supra. 
140. 2 FARRAND 540. 
141. 2 FARRAND 540-41. 
142. 2 FARRAND 541. 
143. 2 FARRAND 541. Another harbinger of hard times for the peace-treaty exception came 
immediately before adjournment on September 7: 
Mr. Williamson & Mr. Spaight moved "that no Treaty of Peace affecting Terri-
torial rights shd be made without the concurrence of two-thirds of the (members 
of the Senate present.)" 
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The Convention voted 8-to-3 against any empowering of the Senate to 
make peace treaties without presidential approval. But the Framers imme-
diately thereafter approved by the same margin the two-thirds require-
ment for Senate approval of all treaties "amended by the exception as to 
Treaties of peace."JU 
The following morning, September 8, the decisions of the prior day came 
unhinged. "A reconsideration of the whole [treaty] clause was agreed 
to."•~s King had earlier that morning moved to strike the peace treaty 
exemption for the two-thirds requirement, while Wilson, to the contrary, 
had proposed eliminating the necessity for an extraordinary majority for 
any treaty. The debate centered on the peace problem. Like Gerry the 
previous day, other Framers showed the influence of passing economic and 
security problems, as well as the influence of more enduring considera-
tions, principally the rights of the majority as against those of the minority. 
Wilson argued: 
If the majority cannot be trusted, it was proof, as observed by 
Mr. Ghorum, that we were not fit for one Society. 
Mr. Govr. Morris was agst. striking out the "exception of 
Treaties of peace" If two thirds of the Senate would be required 
for peace, the Legislature will be unwilling to make war for that 
reason, on account of the Fisheries or the Mississippi, the two 
great objects of the Union. Besides, if a Majority of the Senate 
be for peace, and are not allowed to make it, they will be apt to 
effect their purpose in the more disagreeable mode, of negativing 
the supplies for the war. 
Mr. Williamson remarked that Treaties are to be made in the 
branch of the Govt. where there may be a majority of the States 
without a majority of the people, Eight men may be a majority 
of a quorum, & should not have the power to decide the condi-
tions of peace. There would be no danger, that the exposed 
States, as S. Carolina and Georgia, would urge an improper war 
for the Western Territory. 
Mr. Wilson If two thirds are necessary to make peace, the 
minority may perpetuate war, against the sense of the majority. 
Mr. Gerry enlarged on the danger of putting the essential rights 
of the Union in the hands of so small a number as a majority of 
Mr. King- It will be necessary to look out for securities for some other rights, 
if this principle be established; he moved to extend the motion to- "all present 
rights of the U. States." 
Id. at 543. 
144. 2 FARRAND 541. 
145. 2 FARRAND 548. 
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the Senate, representing perhaps, not one fifth of the people. The 
Senate will be corrupted by foreign influence. 
Mr. Sherman was agst leaving the rights, established by a 
Treaty of Peace, to the Senate, & moved to annex a "proviso that 
no such right shd be ceded without the sanction of the Legisla-
ture." 
Mr. Govr. Morris seconded the ideas of Mr. Sherman 
Mr. Madison observed that it had been too e~sy in the present 
Congress to make Treaties altho' nine States were required for 
the purpose.146 
The Convention then reversed its decision of the prior day, and voted 
eight states to three to strike out "except Treaties of peace."147 There 
ensued a series of votes, with little debate, on the two-thirds requirement 
itself, with some effort to make it more stringent by requiring two-thirds 
of all members of the Senate, not just of those present. At one juncture 
Roger Sherman's less stringent motion to require "a Majority of the whole 
number (of the Senate)" failed only six states to five. 148 Ultimately, how-
ever, the treaty clause prevailed against the opposition of Georgia, New 
Jersey and Pennsylvania. 
The debates provide only fleeting indications of why the Framers finally 
decided to exclude the House from the treaty process and to require Senate 
approval by two-thirds vote of the members present. Drawing on the Phila-
delphia and ratification records, there seem to have been three principal 
reasons for eliminating the House. First, an intent to maximize small state 
power by excluding the element of Congress that reflected population. 
William R. Davie, a Framer, told the North Carolina ratifying convention: 
(T]he extreme jealousy of the little states, and between the 
commercial states and non-importing states, . . . made it indis-
pensable to give the senators, as representatives of states, the 
power of making, or rather ratifying, treaties. Although it mili-
146. 2 FARRAND 548. 
147. 2 FARRAND 548-49. 
148. 2 FARRAND 549. Sherman's purpose may have been to bar treaty-making by less than 
an absolute majority of the Senate's membership, since two-thirds of the senators present at 
any time could fall short of that mark. His purpose may also have been to reduce the majority 
required, as a practical matter, for most treaties. Regarding the narrow demise of Sherman's 
motion, it has been suggested that: 
The change of one state delegation, probably of one man in a divided delegation, 
would have given us this provision instead of the two-thirds vote, and we should 
have revered that arrangement as an expression of the Convention's great wisdom 
instead of looking up to its inspired action in fixing the higher majority. 
D. FLEMING, THE TREATY VETo OF THE AMERICAN SENATE 306 (1930). See also McDOUGAL, supra 
note 13, at 624. 
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tates against every idea of just proportion that the little state of 
Rhode Island should have the same suffrage as Virginia . . . yet 
the small states would not consent to confederate without an 
equal voice in the formation of treaties. Without that equality, 
they apprehended that their interest would be neglected or sacri-
ficed in negotiations. ug 
119 
Second, there apparently was serious question in many Framers' minds 
whether the House, as opposed to the Senate, had the institutional capac-
ity to deal with foreign affairs. The House was thought too large and 
infrequently in session for the requisite speed and secrecy, too short-term 
and fluctuating in its membership for the development of the necessary 
expertise, and too prone to factions to reflect the national interest. Charles 
Cotesworth Pinckney, a Framer, attacked during the South Carolina con-
vention any notion that "the diplomatic power of the Union" might be 
safely vested in the representatives: 
Can secrecy be expected in sixty-five members? The idea is ab-
surd. Besides, their sessions will probably last only two or three 
months in the year; therefore, on that account, they would be a 
very unfit body for negotiation whereas the Senate, from the 
smallness of its numbers, from the equality of power which each 
state has in it, from the length of time for which its members are 
elected, from the long sessions they may have without any great 
inconveniency to themselves or constitutents, joined with the 
president, who is the federal head of the United States, form 
together a body in whom can be best and most safely vested the 
diplomatic power of the Union.1w 
149. 4 EwOT 120. See, e.g., 2 FARRAND 393 (Dickinson); 3 id. at 371 (Washington), 502-ro 
(Madison); 4 ELUOT 27 (Spaight). 
150. 4 ELLIOT 280-81. Pinckney had spoken in the same vein earlier. ld. at 263-65. See, e.g., 
1 FARRAND 426 (Wilson); 2 id. at 318 (Pinckney), 538 (Sherman); 2 EwOT 305-07 (Hamilton), 
506-07 (Wilson); 3 id. at 509 (Corbin); 4 id. at 263 (Butler); THE FEDERAIJST N03. 62 & 53 (J. 
Madison); id. No. 54 (J. Jay). Hamilton minced no words in excluding the HoUSfl from "a 
share in the formation of treaties": 
The fluctuating and ... multitudinous composition of that body forbid us to 
expect in it those qualities which are essential to the proper execution of such a 
trust. Accurate and comprehensive knowledge of foreign politics; a steady and 
systematic adherence to the same views; a nice and uniform sensibility to national 
character; decision, secrecy, and despatch, are incompatible nith the genius of a 
body so variable and so numerous .... The greater frequency of the calls upon 
the House of Representatives and the greater length of time which it v;ould ofien 
be necessary to keep them together when convened, to obtain their sanction in 
the progressive stages of a treaty, would be a source of so great inconvenience and 
expense as alone ought to condemn the project. 
Tm: FEDERALIST No. 75, at 412. 
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Third, the representatives were too closely tied to the public - to the 
full play of democracy - for many of the Framers, especially as regards 
foreign affairs. Recall James Wilson's concern on June 26 to make senators 
"respectable in the eyes of foreign nations" by nine-year terms and 
triennial rotation. 151 James Madison in Federalist No. 62 was more explicit: 
"The necessity of a senate is . . . indicated by the propensity of all single 
and numerous assemblies to yield to sudden and violent passions, and to 
be seduced by factious leaders into intemperate a"nd pernicious resolu-
tions." He added that "a body which is to correct this infirmity ought itself 
to be free from it and consequently ought to be less numerous. It ought, 
more.over, to possess great firmness and consequently ought to hold its 
authority by a tenure of considerable duration."152 
Reasons for the two-thirds requirement are more obscure. Confederation 
practice very likely had an influence, as did the desire to have fewer trea-
ties, and thus fewer entanglements with the rest of the world, than had 
been the case to 1787. Perhaps the dominant motive, however, was protec-
tion of state and regional interests. There appears to have been genuine 
fear of peace treaties approved by only a majority of the Senate - it could 
"be corrupted by foreign influence" to give away American territory, fish-
ing rights, navigation of the Mississippi, and more. 153 
151. See text at note 83 supra. Madison in the same debate opposed having the states pay 
the salaries of their respective senators, Jest it make them creatures of the states: 
One great end of the [Senate] was, that being a firm, wise, and impartial body, 
it might {not) only give stability to the Genl. Govt. in its operations on individu-
als, but hold an even balance among different States. 
1 FARRAND 427-28. Hamilton had previously vented his contempt for the political wisdom of 
the general public, especially regarding foreign affairs. His solutions were a permanent execu-
tive and "one body of the legislature ... constituted during good behaviour or life." /d. ut 
299-300. 
In less extreme tones, James Iredell argued to the North Carolina convention the need for 
a Senate sheltered from the full play of public opinion: 
As the respresentatives of the people may probably be more popular, and it may 
be sometimes necessary for the Senate to prevent factious measures taking place, 
which may be highly injurious to the real interests of the public, the Senate should 
not be at the mercy of every popular clamor. . . . These observations apply even 
to acts of legislation concerning domestic policy; they apply much more forcibly 
to the case of foreign negotiations, which will form one part of the business of the 
Senate .... 
4 ELLIOT 40-41. He went on to elaborate on the need for lengthy senatorial tenure: 
/d. 
The business of a senator . . .. must employ a great deal of time; since a general 
knowledge of the affairs of all the states, and of the relative situation of foreign 
nations, would be indispensable. 
152. THE FEDERAUST No. 62, at 342. See also id. 10, 39 & 49 {J. Madison); id. Nos. 68, 71 
& 73 {A. Hamilton); The Federalist Papers, supra note 32, at 289-90 nn.12 & 17. 
153. 2 FARRAND 548. See generally note 173 infra. 
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Then, too, by early September, the Framers were simply tired and ready 
for resolution, one way or another, of the treaty power. They had been 
meeting six days a week for almost four months, and had problems out-
standing beyond the allocation of control over international agreements. 
It is probable that a part of their intent on September 8 was simply to lay 
treaty issues to rest, no matter how. This they did. There was no further 
discussion of war-peace issues before the Framers concluded their labors 
nine days later. 
B. Other Comment on the Allocation 
Beyond discussion of war and treaty-making, little was said by the Fra-
mers that bore directly on the division of war-peace authority between the 
President and Congress. Without debate, Congress was given control in 
Article I over a range of nonmilitary action with war and peace conse-
quences. During federal-state debate there was specific recognition that 
power over trade and tariffs vitally affects foreign relations, James 
McHenry explicitly equating embargoes with war.15• Similarly, it was rec-
ognized that the treatment of aliens - especially immigrants and foreign 
economic interests - bears on external relations. 1~ But in both instances, 
the issue was not whether Congress or the President should control policy, 
but whether Congress or the states should. 
By the same token, debate over raising, organizing, and supporting the 
military ran to federal-state problems. Very likely because of expectation 
that Congress would control war-peace policy, the Committee on Style 
near the end of the Convention placed in Article I the provisions denying 
the states foreign and military powers, as well as the proviso for suspending 
habeas corpus during military emergency.!~ 
Convention review of clauses dealing with the Executive was similarly 
truncated so far as the allocation of war powers is concerned. The terse 
treatment of the commander-in-chief clause was typical. There was brief 
debate about joint executive-senatorial control over appointments, with 
Wilson and Pinckney expressing reservations about Senate involvement. 
154. "Mr. McHenry conceived that [embargo] power to be included in the power of war." 
2 FARRAND 362. The debate on export duties had an international tenor, id. at 359·63: and 
the subsequent debate on commercial regulation had an even heavier international tone, 
highlighted by Pinckney's proposal that no legislation affecting American foreign trade be 
adopted except by two-thirds vote of both houses of Congress. I d. at 448-53. 
155. See, e.g., 2 FARRAND 268·72; 3 id. at 100 (Letter of Sherman and Ellsworth to the 
Governor of Connecticut, Sept. 26, 1787). 
156. The provisions on state war powers were moved from their prior place v.ith other 
language on the states, and the proviso on habeas corpus from among language on the 
judiciary. Compare 2 FARRAND 576 (habeas corpus) & 577 (state war powers) with id. at 590. 
97. 
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Wilson opted for executive appointments with guidance from a "Council 
... provided its advice not be made obligatory on the President," and 
Pinckney, significantly, "was against joining the Senate in these appoint-
ments, except in the instances of Ambassadors who he thought ought not 
to be appointed by the President. " 157 
Nothing was said about the purpose for the Article IT, Section !language 
that "The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United 
States of America." There is no record of debate explaining why "herein 
granted" does not modify the executive power, as it does the Article I, 
Section 1 grant to Congress of legislative power .158 Early in the Convention, 
however, it was thought crucial to enumerate executive powers to "assist 
the judgment in determining how far they might be safely entrusted to a 
single officer."159 Throughout the Philadelphia proceedings, fear was ex-
pressed over the potential for executive usurpation, with steady desire to 
avoid steps that might permit the potential to become real. 160 The Senate, 
further, was pictured by some as having equal or greater authority than 
the restrained Executive. 161 
Counter to this evidence that the Framers intended no undefined reser-
voir of presidential authority is the fact that they did finally create an 
independent Executive - a development by no means certain during most 
of the Convention. The presidency was made separate from Congress, to 
be held by one man with a non-legislative source of election, and a fixed 
term subject only to impeachment; the Executive was to be eligible for re-
election, and to have his own enumerated powers; and the President would 
not be saddled with a council to oversee his actions.162 
157. 2 FARRAND 538-39. 
158. For a discussion of the perceived parameters of other grants of executive powers, see 
text following note 236 infra. 
159. 1 FARRAND 66-67. William Pierce recorded in his notes a similar statement by another 
Framer: "Mr. Dickinson was of opinion that the powers of the Executive ought to be defined 
before we say in whom the power shall vest." !d. at 74. 
160. E.g., 1 FARRAND 66 (Wilson), 74 (Randolph), 83 (Franklin), 86-87 (Dickinson), 101·03 
(Mason & Franklin), 119 (Rutledge), 152 (Gerry); 2 id. at 35-36, 101 (Williamson); 3 id. at 
169 (Diary of Ezra Stiles, Dec. 21, 1787). Collusion between the President and the Senate was 
also feared. E.g., 2 id. at 278-79 (Randolph), 512 (Williamson), 554 (Hamilton). Bagehot 
caught the Framers' mood regarding executive, if not congressional, authority when he re-
ported: 
[They] shrank from placing sovereign powers anywhere. They feared it would 
generate tyranny; George ill had been a tyrant to them, and come what might, 
they would not make a George ill. 
W. BAGEHOT, THE ENGUSH CoNSTITUTION 218 (1964). See also Berger, War-Making by the 
President, 121 U.PA. L. REv. 29, 33, 35 (1972). 
161. E.g., 2 FARRAND 513 (Randolph), 522-23 (Wilson). During the ratification process, this 
notion was particularly prevalent. See text following note 198 infra. 
162. See generally E. CoRWIN, supra note 45, at 3-16; C. RossiTER, 1787: THE GRAND 
CONVENTION 221-22 (1966) [hereinafter cited as GRAND CoNVENTION]; C. RossiTER, THE AMER· 
!CAN PRESIDENCY 74-81, 87 (2d ed. 1960). 
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Similarly, it was generally assumed that George Washington would be 
the first Executive, and confidence in him may have fostered intent that 
the President have wide powers. A year after the Convention, Pierce Butler 
wrote a relative in England that the powers of the President 
are full great, and greater that I was disposed to make them. Nor, 
Entre Nous, do I believe that they would have been so great had 
not many of the members cast their eyes toward General Wash-
ington as President; and shaped their Ideas of the Power to be 
given to a President, by their opinions of his virtue.1C3 
The weight of the evidence at Philadelphia does suggest that a majority 
ofthe Framers by September wished an Executive who would be more than 
an agent of Congress. But it is difficult to conclude from that intention that 
the Framers, without saying so, also meant to clothe the President with 
an indeterminate reservoir of foreign and military authority via the 
executive-power clause, in light of their caution concerning executive 
power and their expressed desire to limit it. 
On September 17 the Framers came at last to the end of their labors. 
They committed the Journal of their debates to George Washington, "sub-
ject to the order of Congress, if ever formed under the Constitution." It was 
not published immediately lest "a bad use . . . be made" of the delibera-
tions "by those who would wish to prevent the adoption of the Constitu-
tion."164 Thirty-nine men signed the document, and stated their "opinion" 
163. 3 FARRAND 302 (Letter to Weedon Butler, May 5, 1788). Butler in that letter, however, 
also went to lengths to describe the "material difference" between the powers of the British 
King and the American President, picturing the latter as far the weaker. He detailed the 
President's authority in a manner that suggested "full great" powers only as against the 
possibility that the Executive might have been a minion of Congress. Id. at 301-02. Cf. 1 
ANNAlS OF CoNG. 482 (1789) (remark of Thomas Hartley in Congress that presidential"pow-
ers, taken together, are not very numerous"). 
Clinton Rossiter has cited as evidence of Washingtonian reassurance that "when Dr. Frank-
lin predicted on June 4 that 'the first man put at the helm will ben good one,' every delegate 
knew perfectly well who that good man would be." GRAND Co:.'VE.,'llON, supra note 162, at 
221. Omitted by Rossiter, however, was the balance- and less cheery point- of Franklin's 
remark. Franklin said in whole, after a dismal account of the take-over of Holland by the 
House of Orange: 
The first man, put at the helm will be a good one. No body knows what sort may 
come afterwards. The Executive will always be increasing here. as elsewhere, till 
it ends in a monarchy. 
1 FARRAND 103. See also 3 ELuoT 160; 4 id. at 288. 
164. While there was some sentiment for destroying the records, they were preserved to 
permit contradiction of any future "false suggestions." See 2 FARI!M"D 648 (King & Wilson). 
Opinions varied however, as to when such a use would be proper. For example, after Washing-
ton used the Journal in 1796 to support his interpretation of the Framers' intent during a 
controversy with the House of Representatives over its treaty-making role, see 3 id. at 371, 
Madison complained to Jefferson: 
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that Congress should begin government under it upon ratification by nine 
states.185 
The Framers then dissolved the Convention, and went to the states. 
IV. THE RATIFIERS 
Delaware's ratifying convention met first, in December 1787, and Rhode 
Island's last, in 1790 after the Constitution had already gone into effect.100 
All in all, well over a thousand Ratifiers gathered in the thirteen state 
conventions, most of which ended in a matter of days or weeks. 107 The 
Ratifiers' intentions for the Constitution are as important as those of its 
Framers. Madison, in fact, suggested in 1786 that the views of the Ratifiers 
are the more crucial: "If we were to look . . . for the meaning . . . beyond 
the face of the instrument, we must look for it, not in the General Conven-
tion which proposed, but in the State Conventions which accepted and 
ratified it." •ss 
Like the Framers, the Ratifiers gave little attention to the division of 
war-peace authority between the President and Congress. The State con· 
ventions prodigiously proposed changes in the Constitution to meet their 
concerns about government under it. Amendments were seriously consid· 
ered in nine states, and formally advanced by seven. 169 No more than 
twenty percent of the changes sought, however, dealt with the war 
powers, 170 and those that did made clear the Ratifiers' preoccupation with 
domestic tyranny rather than foreign affairs, and their expectation that 
Congress- not the President- would control national policy. The only 
According to my memory & that of others, the Journal of the Convention was, by 
a vote deposited with the P., to be kept sacred until called for by some competent 
authority. How can this be reconciled with the use he has made of it? 
ld. at 372 (letter of April 4, 1796). 
165. 2 FARRAND 664-65. The Constitution provides that "the Ratification of the Conven-
tions of nine States shall be sufficient for the Establishment of this Constitution between tho 
States so ratifying the Same." u.s. CONST. art. vn. 
166. Rhode Island acted under the threat of being treated as a foreign nation. See J. 
LANDON, THE CONSTITUI'IONAL HISTORY AND GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES 123 (2d rev. 
ed. 1905). 
167. See note 8 supra. See also 1 ELLIOT 318-37. 
168. C. WARREN, supra note 8, at 794. 
169. Amendments were sought by Massachusetts, 1 ELLIOT 322-23; Maryland, 2 id. at 547-
56; New Hampshire, 1 id. at 325-27; New York, id. at 327-31; Rhode Island, id. at 334-37; 
South Carolina, id. at 325; and Virginia, 3 id. at 657-63. Amendments suggested during tho 
first North Carolina convention, see 4 id. at 242-47, died when the delegates rejected the 
Constitution as a whole; and the Pennsylvania proposals were offered by a rump group that 
gathered after the state convention, 2 id. at 542. 
170. Some of the revisions were labeled bills of rights and others simply amendments. 
Counting them as they were defined by the conventions tends to understate the number of 
proposals actually made since several matters were often grouped together as a single "right" 
or amendment. Nonetheless, a gross measure suffices to suggest what was on the Ratifiers' 
minds. So counted, almost 250 rights or amendments were advanced. Of these, at most 50 
dealt with war powers. 
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aspects of executive war powers to attract any amendments whatsoever 
were the President's authority to command in the field and to pardon 
traitors.171 
The Ratifiers, on the other hand, were concerned with congressional 
authority on many fronts. For instance, there were amendments to raise 
the majority by which Congress may declare warm and the Senate may 
approve commercial treaties;173 to require a three-fourths vote of both the 
Senate and House for treaties adversely affecting American territory, fish-
ing or river navigation;m to force each house to publish its journals at least 
annually "except such parts thereof, relating to treaties, alliances, or mili-
tary operations, as, in their judgment, require secrecy";m to hedge congres-
sional capacity to suspend habeas corpus during military emergency;m 
and above all to limit the legislators' control over organizing, raising, and 
supporting standing armies and state militia. m 
We know today significantly more about the Framers' debates at Phila-
delphia than most of the Ratifiers did. The Framers met in camera, and 
the official Journal of their discussions was not made public for twenty 
171. Only three proposed amendments dealt with the President's war powers. New York 
moved to require: "[T]he President or person exercising his powers for the time being, shall 
not command any army in the field in person, without the previous desire of the Congress." 
1 EwoT 330. An unsuccessful effort was made at the Maryland convention to propose a 
constitutional amendment forbidding the President to "command the army in person, '~ith­
out the consent of Congress." 2 Id. at 553. The New York convention also proposed an 
amendment which would have made executive clemency in cases of treason conditional upon 
congressional approval. 1 /d. at 330. 
172. 1 EWOT 330 (N.Y.); id. at 336 (R.I.). After ratification, Thomas Jefferson oolieved 
that a two-thirds majority was needed. 7 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 220, 222, 243-44 
(J. Boyd ed. 1958). Among the would-be amendments of the abortive North Carolina conven-
tion was one that Congress "not introduce foreign troops" into America v.ithout a two-thirds 
vote of both houses. 4 EwOT 247. 
173. 3 ELLIOT 660 (Va.); 4 id. at 245 (N.C.). North Carolina also \\ished no treaties to be 
in conflict with the Constitution or with any federal statute not first repealed by Congress. 4 
/d. at 246. Among the rejected Maryland amendments was a prohibition against treaties 
contrary to state constitutions or bills of rights. 2 Id. at 553. 
174. 3 EwoT 660 (Va.); 4 id. at 245 (N.C.). 
175. 1 EwoT 336 (R.I.); 3 id. at 659-60 (Va.); 4 id. at 245 (N.C.). Such a requirement had 
bound the Confederation Congresses. See 1 id. at 83 (Art. ofConfed. art. IX). New York went 
even further, insisting "that both houses of Congress shall always keep their doors open 
during their sessions, unless business may, in their opinion, require secrecy." /d. at 330. 
176. New York proposed: "That the privilege of the habeas corpus shall not, by any law, 
be suspended for a longer term than six months, or until twenty days after the meeting of 
the Congress next following the act for such suspension." 1 EwOT 330. 
177. The great majority of the pertinent amendments went to limit congressional capacity 
to raise standing armies and to control the militia; to ensure civil rule and guarantee citizens' 
rights to bear arms and have no troops quartered in their homes during peace. The dominant 
theme of these revisions was the need to protect state and individual interests against over-
weening federal authority, most manifest to the Rntifiers in Congress. See, e.g., 1 EwOT 326 
(N.H.), 328 (N.Y.), 336 (R.I.); 2 id. at 552-53 (Md.); 3 id. at 660 (Va.). 
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years more. Accounts that certain Framers did offer during the state con-
ventions were skimpy and often scrambled. Accordingly, the Ratifiers' 
intentions concerning the war-power provisions that they approved were 
influenced far less by the Framers' debates than by the Constitution's 
words, by newspaper and pamphlet interpretatirms of them, and by the 
body of experience and assumptions shared by leading Americans of the 
era. 
Of the newspaper and pamphlet comment, The Federalist most reflected 
the Philadelphia consensus, but it is questionable whether these essays 
shaped the Ratifiers' views nearly as much as they have those of later 
Americans.178 Nonetheless, because of the subsequent importance of The 
Federalist, its conclusions receive full play here. 
A. War-Making 
"Are the people of England more secure," asked John Marshall rhetori-
cally of the Virginia Convention, "if the Commons have no voice in declar-
ing war? [O]r are we less secure by having the Senate joined with the 
President?" 179 Marshall's exclusion of the House from war-commencement 
decisions was no doubt a momentary lapse, but it does suggest the impreci-
sion accompanying the Ratifiers' deliberations. 
Marshall notwithstanding, it seems that the Ratifiers generally equated 
Congress' power to declare war under the Constitution with its power to 
determine on war under the Articles of Confederation. Robert R. Livings-
ton put it most directly in the New York Convention: "But, say the gentle-
men, our present [Confederation] Congress have not the same powers [as 
those proposed for Congress under the Constitution]. I answer, They have 
the very same ... [including] the power of making war .... "180 The 
declare-war clause, in any event, posed no problems for even those state 
delegates most allergic to the new Constitution. The first North Carolina 
178. In 1825 Jefferson characterized The Federalist as the source 
to which appeal is habitually made by all, and rarely declined or denied by any 
as evidence of the general opinion of those who framed and of those who accepted 
the Constitution of the United States, on questions as to its genuine meaning. 
The Federalist Papers, supra note 32, at xi. Charles Beard, who studied each delegate to tho 
Philadelphia Convention, concluded that the authors of The Federalist "generalized tho 
political doctrines of the members ofthe Convention with a high degree of precision, in spite 
of the great diversity of opinion which prevailed on many matters." /d. at 280 n.28. And 
Corwin suggested: "It cannot be reasonably doubted that Hamilton was here, as at other 
points, endeavoring to reproduce the matured conclusions of the Convention itself." E. Con-
WIN, THE DocrRINE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 44 (1914). So far as the impact of The Federalist on 
the Ratifiers was concerned, see note 35 supra and accompanying text. 
179. 3 ELUOT 233. 
180. 2 ELLIOT 278. See also 2 id. at 284 (Jay), 528 (Wilson); 3 id. at 259 (Madison); TilE 
FEDERALIST No. 23 (A. Hamilton); id. No. 41 (J. Madison); Lofgren, supra note 10, at 683·84. 
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convention, while finding the document too defective for ratification, al-
lowed the clause giving Congress the power to "declare War [and] grant 
Letters of Marque and Reprisal" to be "read without any observation."111 
The modest attention given this clause appears to have stemmed from 
the unanimous expectation that it left the President no independent war-
making authority. James Wilson's comments in Pennsylvania say much, 
both in their implicit equation of declaring and commencing war and in 
their explicit foreclosure of unilateral executive action: 
This system will not hurry us into war; it is calculated to guard 
against it. It will not be in the power of a single man, or a single 
body of men, to involve us in such distress; for the important 
power of declaring war is vested in the legislature at large: this 
declaration must be made with the concurrence of the House of 
Representatives: from this circumstance we may draw a certain 
conclusion that nothing but our national interest can draw us into 
a war.182 
In North Carolina, James Iredell stated that "The President has not the 
power of declaring war by his own authority . . . . Those powers are vested 
in other hands."183 As we have already seen, Pierce Butler explained to the 
South Carolina convention that war-making by the President on his 0\'m 
authority "was objected to [by the Framers], as throwing into his hands 
the influence of a monarch, having an opportunity of involving his country 
in a war .... " 184 Charles Pinckney also told the South Carolina delegates 
that "the President's powers did not permit him to declare war. "•r.s 
In similar vein, Hamilton declared in Federalist No. 69 that the power 
"of the British king extends to the declaring of war . . . which, by the 
Constitution under consideration, would appertain to the Legislature."m 
And George Clinton's bitterly antifederalist Letters of Cato found no inde-
pendent war-making authority for the Executive. Rather, in his effort to 
equate the President with the King, Clinton resorted to a more realistic 
view than Hamilton of the royal prerogative: 
181. 4 ELLIOT 94. 
182. 2 EwOT 528. 
183. 4 EwOT 107. Iredell continued: 
The power of declaring war is expressly given to Congress, that is, to the two 
branches of the legislature- the Senate, composed of representatives of the state 
legislatures, the House of Representatives, deputed by people at large. They have 
also expressly delegated to them the powers ofmising and supporting armies, and 
of providing and maintaining a navy. 
Id. at 107-08. 
184. 4 EwOT 263. See note 104 supra and accompanying text. 
185. 4 EwOT 287. See also 2 id. at 195 (Ellsworth); 3 id. at 201 (Randolph). 
186. THE FEDERALIST No. 69, at 379. See generally text at note 191 infra. 
128 VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [VoL. 15:1 
[T]hough it may be asserted that the king of Great Britain has 
the express power of making peace or war, yet he never thinks it 
prudent to do so without the advice of his Parliament, from whom 
he is to derive his support, and therefore these powers, in both 
president and king, are substantially the same . . . . 187 
The Framers' change of "make" to "declare" was not mentioned during 
the ratification process, much less relied on by those opposed to the Consti-
tution as evidence that the President might make war on his own 
authority. 
By the same token, the Ratifiers understood the commander-in-chief 
clause very narrowly. It was more discussed and opposed in the state 
conventions than had been the case in Philadelphia. Robert Miller in 
North Carolina was particularly fearful that the President had been given 
undue military authority and "considered it as a defect in the Constitu-
tion, that it was not expressly provided that Congress should have the 
direction of the motions of the army."188 James Iredell, also in North Caro-
lina, stated the more general view that conduct of hostilities is appropri-
ately an executive function. He stressed the advantages of a single com-
mander. But Iredell went on to equate presidential authority as 
commander-in-chief with that of the state governors: 
I believe most of the governors of the different states have 
powers similar to those of the President. In almost every country, 
the executive has the command of the military forces. From the 
nature of the thing, the command of armies ought to be delegated 
to one person only. The secrecy, dispatch, and decision, which are 
necessary in military operations, can only be expected from one 
person. The President, therefore, is to command the military 
forces of the United States, and this power I think a proper one; 
at the same time it will be found to be sufficiently guarded, lSD 
Hamilton in Federalist Nos. 69, 70, 72, 74 and 75 similarly construed the 
clause. In No. 74 he stressed the overwhelming merit of unified command 
during war- a reality recognized by the state constitutions: 
The propriety of this provision is so evident, and . . . so conso-
nant to the precedents of the State Constitutions in general, that 
little need be said to explain or enforce it. Even those of them 
187. Cato !Vin ESSAYS ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 263·64 (P. Ford ed.1892) 
(Letter of Nov. 8, 1787). 
188. 4 ELLIOT 114. No other participant in the ratification debates went to Miller's lengths 
in ignoring the lesson of the Revolution concerning the need for unified command. 
189. 4 ELLIOT 107. See also 3 id. at 497 (Nicholas [Va.]). George Mason disagreed "because 
the governor did not possess such extensive powers as the President, and had no influence 
over the navy." Id. at 497. 
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which have, in other respects coupled the Chief Magistrate with 
a council, have for the most part concentrated the military au-
thority in him alone. Of all the cares or concerns of government, 
the direction of war most peculiarly demands those qualities 
which distinguish the exercise of power by a single hand. The 
direction of war, implies the direction of common strength; and 
the power of directing and employing the common strength forms 
an usual and essential part in the definition of Executive author-
ity .190 
129 
In No. 69, however, Hamilton ignored the advantages of single command 
to hammer at the restrictive nature of the presidential military preroga-
tive, as compared to that of the British king and even state governors. He 
began by reciting limits on the Executive's command of the militia and 
went from there: 
First. The President will have only the occasional command of 
such part of the militia of the nation as by Legislative provision 
may be called into the actual service of the Union. The King . . . 
and the Governor of New York, have at all times the entire com-
mand of all the militia within their several jurisdictions. In this 
article, therefore, the power of the President would be inferior to 
that of either the monarch or the governor. Second. The President 
is to be Commander-in-chief of the army and navy of the United 
States. In this respect his authority . . . would amount to noth-
ing more than the supreme command and direction of the mili-
tary and naval forces, as first general and admiral of the Confed-
eracy; while that of the British king extends to the declaring of 
war, and to the raising and regulating of fleets and armies; all 
which, by the Constitution under consideration, would appertain 
to the Legislature . . . . [I]t may well be a question, whether 
[the constitutions] of New Hampshire and Massachusetts ... 
do not, in this instance, confer larger powers upon their respective 
190. Hamilton in Federalist No. 70, at 385, stated: 
That unity is conducive to energy will not be disputed. Decision, activity, secrecy, 
and despatch will generally characterize the proceedings of one man, in a much 
more eminent degree than the proceedings of any great number ••.. 
He had just noted: "Energy in the Executive is a leading character in the definition or good 
government. It is essential to the protection of the community against foreign attacks." /d. 
at 384. He continued: "In the conduct of war •.• the energy of the Executive is the bulwark 
of national security .... " Id. at 388. In No. 72, at 396, Hamilton described as executive 
functions "the arrangement of the army and navy, the direction of the operations or war," 
and in No. 75, at 410, he wrote that "the execution of the laws, and the employment or the 
common strength, either for this purpose, or for the common defence, seem to comprise all 
the functions of the Executive magistrate." Cf. THE FEDERAUST No. 64 (J. Jay). 
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Governors than could be claimed by a President of the United 
States. 191 
Evidence is compelling that the Ratifiers, like the Framers, understood 
the President as commander-in-chief to be simply "first general and admi-
ral"- a man whose "energy" could save the country during military crisis, 
but who had authority neither to commit America to war, nor to govern 
any but the strategic and tactical aspects of its conflicts, once begun. 192 
Some Ratifiers did, however, question the commander-in-chief clause. 
They feared the base it might provide for unconstitutional seizure of 
power. "[T]he President, in the field, at the head of his army," warned 
Patrick Henry in Virginia, "can prescribe the terms on which he shall reign 
master .... " 193 James Monroe feared that the Executive could use the 
army to escape punishment for his crimes, thus encouraging foreign gov· 
ernments to bribe him to the country's ruin,l94 George Mason, also in the 
191. THE FEDERALIST No. 69, 379. 
192. Hamilton in Federalist Nos. 70 & 72 stressed the necessity for executive "energy" 
during national emergencies. See note 190 supra. But he wrote to rebut arguments that tho 
President should have been plural, saddled with a council, or limited to a fixed number of 
terms. He wrote in No. 70, at 385, that the "ingredients which constitute energy In tho 
Executive are, unity; duration; an adequate provision for its support; competent powers." 
Nothing in his discussion of "competent powers" suggested that the President would over 
have dictatorial authority, even during crises. See notes 244-46 infra and accompanying text. 
C{. 2 ELLIOT 359-60; 3 id. at 79 (Randolph), 160 (Henry). 
In Federalist Nos. 23, 26 & 34 Hamilton did urge unlimited federal capacity to moot 
military threats, but with emphasis more on congressional than executive authority: 
Nothing ... can be more fallacious, than to infer the extent of any power prop or 
to be lodged in the National Government, from an estimate of its immediate 
necessities. There ought to be a capacity to provide for future contingincies, as 
they may happen; and as these are illimitable in their nature, so it is impossible 
safely to limit that capacity. 
THE FEDERALIST No. 34, at 177. Again, in No. 26, at 140, he wrote: "The idea of restraining 
the Legislative authority, in the means of providing for the national defence, is one of those 
refinements, which owe their origin to a zeal for liberty more ardent than enlightened." 
Finally, in No. 23, at 126, he noted: 
The authorities essential to the common defence are these: to raise armies; to 
build and equip fleets; to prescribe rules for the government of both; to direct 
their operations; to provide for their support. These powers ought to exist without 
limitation; because it is impossible to foresee or to define the extent and variety 
of the means which may be necessary to satisfy them. The circumstances that 
endanger the safety of nations are infinite; and for this reason, no constitutional 
shackles can wisely be imposed on the power to which the care of it is committed. 
This power ought be co-extensive with all the possible combinations of such 
circumstances; and ought to be under the direction of the same councils, which 
are appointed to preside over the common defence. 
See also THE FEDERALIST No. 37 (J. Madison). 
193. 3 ELLIOT 59. See Wormuth, supra note 53, at 635; cf. THE FEDERALIST No. 31, at 167 
(A. Hamilton) (the anti-federalists' "mode of reasoning appears sometimes to tum upon tho 
supposition of usurpation in the National Government"). 
194. 3 ELLIOT 220. 
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Virginia Convention, would have had the President command, but not in 
person without the consent of Congress: 
[He] admitted the propriety of his being commander-in-chief, 
so far as to give orders and have a general superintendency, but 
he thought it would be dangerous to let him command in person, 
without any restraint, as he might make a bad use of it. He was, 
then, clearly of opinion that the consent of a majority of both 
houses of Congress should be required before he could take com-
mand in person.195 
Reluctance to have Presidents in the field was linked with fear of stand-
ing armies during peace. The failure of the Constitution to prohibit a 
national military establishment except during war was a frequent antifed-
eralist objection. It was answered by assurances that the militia would 
provide the back-bone of peacetime defense; lPG or by assurances that Con-
gress controlled raising and supporting the army, thus precluding execu-
tive misfeasance.197 As Hamilton argued in Federalist No. 26, the Constitu-
195. 3 Eu.IOT496. See note 171 supra. Mason's concern that the President's military power 
dangerously exceeded state governors' was just mentioned, note 189 supra. His angst over 
armed Executives, though, may have been surpassed by his fear of militant Congresses 
controlling both declarations and tools of war: "How is this compared to the British constitu-
tion?" he asked. "Though the king may declare war, the Parliament has the means of carrying 
it on. It is not so here. Congress can do both. Were it not for that check in the British 
government, the monarch would be a despot." ld. at 379. 
196. For example, Randolph suggested during the Virginia convention: 
With respect to a standing army, I believe there was not a member in the federal 
Convention, who did not feel indignation at such an institution. What remedy 
then, could be provided? Leave the country defenceless? In order to provide for 
our defence, and exclude the dangers of a standing army, the general defence is 
left to those who are the objects of defence. It is left to the militia, who will suffer 
if they become instruments of tyranny. 
3 Eu.IOT 401. For somewhat less hopeful views of the militia, see, e.g., id. at 177-78 (Lee), 
378 (Mason); THE FEDERAUST No. 25 (A. Hamilton). 
197. In the North Carolina convention, Spaight said: 
True that the command of the army and navy was given to the President; but 
... Congress, who had the power of raising armies, could certainly prevent any 
abuse of that authority in the President-that they alone had the means of sup-
porting armies, and that the President was impeachable if he in any manner 
abused his trust. 
4 E~poT 114. See generally 2 id. at 348-49 (Hamilton); 3 id. at 393-94 (Madison); 4 id. at 2SS 
(Pinckney); THE FEDERAUST No. 24 (A. Hamilton); id. No. 41 (J. Madison). 
George Mason was not impressed: 
Although Congress are to raise the army, ••. no security arises from that; 
for, in time of war, they must and ought to raise an army, which will be numerous, 
or otherwise, according to the war, and then the President is to command \\ithout 
any control. 
3 Eu.IOT at 497-98. 
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tion's two-year limit on military appropriations would ensure legislative 
oversight, because Congress 
will be obliged . . . once at least in every two years, to deliberate 
upon the propriety of keeping a military force on foot; to come to 
a new resolution on the point . . . . They are not at liberty to vest 
in the Executive department, permanent funds for the support of 
an army; if they were even incautious enough to be willing to 
repose in it so improper a confidence. 198 
The Ratifiers' stingy concept of the Executive as commander-in-chief 
was also reflected in concern that Congress, not the President, was the 
potential military despot. All agreed that Congress controlled the military 
purse, and there were some who believed that the legislators dominated the 
sword as well, thus putting the country's armies into congressional hands 
without check.199 
In 1790-91 James Wilson - who had been a leading Framer, Ratifier, 
and proponent of executive power - gave a series of law lectures in which 
.he termed the war powers legislative: 
The power of declaring war, and the other powers naturally con-
nected with it, are vested in Congress. To provide and maintain 
a navy - to make rules for its government - to grant letters of 
marque and reprisal - to make rules concerning captures - to 
raise and support armies - to establish rules for their regulation 
- to provide for organizing . . . the militia, and for calling them 
forth in the service of the Union - all these are powers naturally 
connected with the power of declaring war. All these powers, 
therefore, are vested in Congress.200 
198. THE FEDERALIST No. 26, at 143. 
199. During the Philadelphia Convention, George Mason had warned: 
The purse and sword must not be in the same hands, if this is true, and the 
Legislature are able to raise revenues and make & direct a war, I shall agree to a 
restraining power of the Legislature either in the Executive or a council of Revi-
sion-
1 FARRAND 144. Mason's concern on this score was not met by the Constitution, see note 195 
supra and accompanying text; and he argued during the Virginia convention that Congress 
held both the purse and the sword. 3 ELLIOT 378-81. Others shared his fear. 2/d. at 376-77 
(Smith [N.Y.)), 552; 3 id. at 172 (Henry). Cf. THE FEDERALIST No. 24 (A. Hamilton). 
Recall that the bulk of the constitutional amendments proposed in the war-peace area 
sought to lessen congressional control over the military. See note 177 supra and accompanying 
text. Federalist rebuttal to the purse and sword specter was mixed, some arguing that their 
union was acceptable in legislative hands and to be dreaded only in executive, e.g., 2 
ELLIOT 195 (Ellsworth); others that Congress would act wisely and with restraint, e.g., id. at 
536-37 (McKean [Pa.)); and a few that the sword was not in congressional hands, e.g., id. 
at 348-49 (Hamilton). 
200. 1 THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 433 (McCloskey ed. 1967). 
1974] WAR PowERS ALLoCATION 133 
The President, Wilson continued, has simply "to take care that the laws 
be faithfully executed; he is commander in chief of the army and navy . . . 
[and] he ha[s] authority to lead the army."m• 
Thomas Jefferson, who found the Constitution defective on other scores, 
was not perturbed by its allocation of war powers between the President 
and Congress. In his celebrated "dog of war" letter to James Madison in 
1789, he wrote that "[w]e have already given in example one effectual 
check to the Dog of war by transferring the power of letting him loose from 
the Executive to the Legislative body, from those who are to spend to those 
who are to pay."202 
B. Diplomacy, especially Treaty-Making 
The Ratifiers clearly did not mean for the President to make treaties on 
his own authority. William Davie, a Framer, complained to the North 
Carolina convention: 
On the principle of the propriety of vesting this power in the 
Executive department, it would seem that the whole power of 
making treaties ought to be left to the President, who, being 
elected by the people of the United States at large, will have their 
general interest at heart. But that jealousy of executive power 
which had shown itself so strongly in all American governments, 
would not admit this improvement.Z03 
Francis Corbin in Virginia was more enthusiastic about the lack of execu-
tive control over treaty-making: "It would be dangerous to give this power 
to the President alone, as the concession of such power to one individual 
is repugnant to republican principles. It is, therefore, given to the Presi-
dent and the Senate (who represent the states in their individual capaci-
ties) conjointly."204 And among many others who sounded the theme, 
James Wilson said in Pennsylvania that "[n]either the President nor the 
Senate, solely can complete a treaty; they are checks upon each other 
''205 
While there was isolated contrary comment, :o~ it was generally intended 
that the senators participate with the President in all aspects of treaty-
201. ld. at 440. 
202. 15 THE PAPERS or THoMAS JEFFERSON 397 (J. Boyd ed. 1958). 
203. 4 EwoT 120. See Berger, The Presidential Monopoly of Foreign Relations, 71 MICJI. 
L. REv. 1, 37-42 (1972). 
204. 3 ELUOT 509-10. 
205. 2 EwoT 507. See also 2 id. at 533 (McKean [Pa.)); 3 id. at 240 (Nicholas [Va.)); 4 
id. at 115-16 (Johnston [N.Y.)), 280-81 (Pinckney). 
206. James Wilson, while attempting to convince the Pennsylvania convention that the 
Senate would not "swallow up everything," stated that the Senators "can make no treaties: 
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making; further, that they jointly oversee American foreign affairs as a 
whole, with some expectation that the Senate was to be the dominant 
partner. In Massachusetts, Ames felt that "[i]t need not be said that [the 
senators] are principally to direct the affairs of wars and treaties."201 King 
defended a six-year term for senators because "[i]f for a shorter period, 
how can they be acquainted with the rights and interests of nations, so as 
to form advantageous treaties?"208 And Bowdoin described the Senate as 
"having not only legislative, but executive powers; being a legislating, and, 
at the same time, an advising body to the executive."209 
In the New York convention, G. Livingston found the Senate "a danger-
ous body," citing its powers as "council to the President, and in the form-
ing of treaties," and terming it "a council of appointment, by whom am-
bassadors and other officers of state were to be appointed."210 Robert Liv-
ingston was more sanguine about the virtue of the Senate, but equally free 
in his understanding of its diplomatic authority: "They are to form treaties 
with foreign nations. This requires a comprehensive knowledge of foreign 
politics, and an extensive acquaintance with characters, whom . . . they 
have to negotiate with, together with such an intimate conception of our 
best interests, relative to foreign powers, as can only be derived from much 
experience in this business."211 He later stated that the "Senate was to 
transact all foreign business .... " 212 Hamilton, too, said that the sena-
tors, "together with the President, are to manage all our concerns with 
foreign nations; they must understand all their interests, and their politi-
cal systems."213 
James Wilson in Pennsylvania went to lengths to defend the President 
against the charge that he "is no more than the tool of the Senate. " 214 And 
McKean, finding the senators "joined with the President in concluding 
they can approve of none, unless the President . . . lays it before them." 2 ELUOT 465·66. 
Still engaged in the same effort, he "beg[ged] leave to repeat, that this Senate can do 
nothing without the concurrence of some other branch of government . . . . With regard to 
their power in forming treaties, they can make none; they are only auxiliaries to the Presi-
dent." I d. at 476-77. Charles Cotesworth Pinckney, in turn, told the South Carolina Rntifiers 
that "At last it was agreed to give the President a power of proposing treaties, as he was the 
ostensible head of the Union, and to vest the Senate (where each state had an equal voice) 
with the power of agreeing or disagreeing to the terms proposed." 4 Id. at 265. But, a few 
sentences later he reported that the Framers had vested in the "President and Senate joined 
. . . the diplomatic authority of the Union." I d. 
207. 2 ELUOT 46. 
208. 2 ELUOT 47. 
209. 2 ELUOT 127. 
210. 2 ELUOT 286·87. 
211. 2 ELUOT 291. 
212. 2 ELUOT 353. 
213. 2 ELUOT 306. 
214. 2 EwOT 510. See generally id. at 510-14 (Wilson); note 206 supra. 
1974] WAR POWERS ALLOCATION 135 
treaties," stated that "it therefore behooves them to be conversant with 
the politics of the nations of the world, and the dispositions of the sover-
eigns and their ministers . . . . " 215 
In Virginia, Randolph could not "conceive" how the President's "powers 
can be called formidable . . . . He can do no important act without the 
concurrence of the Senate."216 "Consider the connection of the Senate with 
the executive," declared Monroe. "Has it not an authority over all the acts 
of the executive? What are the acts which the President can do without 
them?"217 And Patrick Henry, though chary of Presidents on horseback,ns 
lacked similar fear of them at the treaty table: "The honorable gentleman 
told you that there were two bodies, or branches, which must concur to 
make a treaty. Sir, the President, as distinguished from the Senate, is 
nothing. They will combine, and be as one."218 
Iredell speaking in North Carolina pointed to the institutional advan-
tages of the Senate, as against the weaknesses of the House, in public 
affairs, and stated that "they apply much more forcibly to the case of 
foreign negotiations, which will form one part of the business of the Sen-
ate."220 He later said that the President "is to regulate all intercourse with 
foreign powers, and it is his duty to impart to the Senate every material 
intelligence lie receives." "If it should appear," Iredell continued, "that he 
has not given them full information, but has concealed important intellig-
ence which he ought to have communicated, and by that means induced 
them to enter into measures injurious to their country, and which they 
would not have consented to had the true state of things been disclosed to 
them," impeachment Iies.221 Spencer, also a delegate to the North Carolina 
convention, felt that by dint of the Senators' capacity to impeach the 
President, they "possess the chief of the executive power; they are, in 
effect, to form treaties . . . and they have obviously, in effect, the appoint-
ment of all the officers of the United States," on the assumption that they 
could reject the President's nominations until he bent to their will.m 
Finally, in South Carolina, Charles Pinckney argued to similar effect 
that the President "cannot appoint to an office without the Senate con-
cur[ring]; nor can he enter into treaties, or, in short, take a single step in 
his government, without their advice. "223 
215. 2 ELUOT 533. 
216. 3 ELUOT 201. 
217. 3 ELUOT 221. 
218. See text at note 193 supra. 
219. 3 ELUOT 353. 
220. 4 ELUOT 41. 
221. 4 ELUOT 127. See also note 151 supra. 
222. 4 ELUOT 116. 
223. 4 ELUOT 258. See also note 104 supra (remarks of Judge Pendleton [S.C.)). 
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Jay and Hamilton in The Federalist took a broader view of the Presi-
dent's role in foreign affairs, but with no suggestion that he might ignore 
the Senate in their conduct. Madison talked only of the Senators. In No. 
62, Madison justified their age and period-of-citizenship requirements on 
the grounds that Senators must have "greater extent of information and 
stability of character," because they will be "participating immediately in 
transactions with foreign nations."224 Madison began No. 63 with a "fifth 
desideratum illustrating the utility of a Senate": 
Without a select and stable member of the Government, the 
esteem of foreign Powers will not only be forfeited by an 
unenlightened and variable policy . . . but the national councils 
will not possess that sensibility to the opinion of the world, which 
is perhaps not less necessary in order to merit, than it is to obtain, 
its respect and confidence.225 
Jay in Federalist No. 64 focused on treaty-making, indicating that the 
Senators' long and staggered terms enabled them "to become perfectly 
acquainted with our national concerns, and to form and introduce a system 
for the management of them."226 He then turned to institutional advan-
tages peculiar to the President: "Secrecy and despatch." Executive unity 
facilitates gathering "intelligence" from those "who would rely on the 
secrecy of the President, but who would not confide in that of the Senate," 
and it permits him better than the Senators to respond to changing "tides" 
in "the affairs of men." Jay, however, limited to "preparatory and auxil-
iary measures" the action which the President might take solely on his own 
authority, justified by a need for speed or secrecy, and he said that "should 
any circumstance occur, which requires the advice and consent of the 
Senate, he may at any time convene them."227 
Hamilton touched the allocation of diplomatic authority between the 
President and Senate in several papers. He made explicit in Federalist No. 
75 their joint control over treaties. Treaty-making, he said, "will be found 
to partake more of the Legislative than of the Executive characters, though 
it does not seem strictly to fall within the definition of either . . . . The 
power . . . seems, therefore, to form a distinct department, and to belong, 
properly, neither to the Legislative nor to the Executive."228 Thus, he con-
224. THE FEDERALIST No. 62, at 339. 
225. ld. No. 63, at 345. 
226. ld. No. 64, at 354. 
227. ld. at 355. 
228. !d. No. 75, at 410. Hamilton continued: 
The qualities elsewhere detailed, as indispensable in the management of foreign 
negotiations, point out the Executive as the most fit agent in those transactions; 
while the vast importance of the trust, and the operation of treaties as laws, plead 
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eluded that "the union of the Executive with the Senate, in the article of 
treaties, is no infringement" of the separation of powers.w 
Hamilton apparently expected the President to handle the mechanics of 
American communications with other nations. In Federalist No. 72, he 
termed the "actual conduct of foreign negotiations" an executive func-
tion,230 and he argued in No. 75: 
To have intrusted the power of making treaties to the Senate 
alone, would have been to relinquish the benefits of the constitu-
tional agency of the President in the conduct of foreign negotia-
tions. It is true that the Senate would, in that case, have the 
option of employing him in this capacity; but they would also 
have the option of letting it alone; and pique or cabal might 
induce the latter rather than the former. Besides this, the minis-
terial servant of the Senate could not be expected to enjoy the 
confidence and respect of foreign Powers in the same extent with 
the constitutional representatives of the nation; and, of course, 
would not be able to act with an equal degree of weight or effi-
cacy.231 
But the President's "constitutional agency . . . . in the conduct of for-
eign affairs" was to be senatorially guided. In Federalist No. 84, Hamilton 
stated that "the management of foreign negotiations will naturally de-
volve" upon the Executive, "according to general principles concerted with 
the Senate, and subject to their final concurrence. "231 While discussing 
treaty-making in No. 66, he said that "[s]o far as might concern the mis-
behavior of the Executive in perverting the instructions, or contravening 
the views of the Senate, we need not be apprehensive of a want of a 
disposition in that body to punish the abuse of their confidence, or to 
vindicate their own authority."233 He spoke in No. 75 of legislative "sanc-
tion in the progressive states of a treaty,"23' and in No. 77 indicated that 
it might often be necessary to "call" the Senate "together with a view to" 
treaties "when it would be unnecessary and improper to convene the House 
of Representatives. " 235 
I d. 
Thus, presidential prerogative over American diplomacy was not Hamil-
strongly for the participation of the whole, or a portion or the Legislative body in 
the office of making them. 
229. Id. at 410-11. 
230. Id. No. 72, at 396. 
231. Id. No. 75, at 411. 
232. I d. No. 84, at 475. 
233. I d. No. 66, at 368. 
234. I d. No. 75, at 412. 
235. Id. No. 77, at 423. 
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ton's position, except perhaps as to the channels offoreign communication. 
Jay, more than Hamilton, was ambiguous even as to executive prerogative 
over channels. And Madison's comments in no way barred the Senate from 
involvement in any aspect of American diplomacy that it wished to enter. 
C. Other Comment on the Allocation 
The range of congressional authority over action with indirect impact on 
American war and peace received some attention in The Federalist, but, 
as was true in Philadelphia, in a federal-state context. Madison and Ham-
ilton argued foreign affairs to justify congressional power to tax and bor-
row, control foreign trade, define and punish piracy and other offenses 
against the law of nations, regulate the coining and value of domestic and 
foreign money, punish counterfeiters, fix weights and measures, and estab-
lish a uniform rule of naturalization.236 
When the Ratifiers thought of executive versus legislative control over 
foreign affairs in terms other than war and treaty-making, they turned to 
diplomatic appointments, thus furthering the association in their minds of 
the President and Senate in foreign matters. In a 1789 congressional 
speech, Framer and Ratifier Roger Sherman spoke of appointments and 
treaties when he constitutionally linked the Executive and Senators "in 
every transaction which respects the business of negotiation with foreign 
powers": 
The establishment of every treaty requires the voice of the Sen-
ate, as does the appointment of every officer conducting the busi-
ness. These two objects are expressiy provided for in the Consti-
tution, and they lead me to believe that the two bodies ought to 
act jointly in every transaction which respects the business of 
negotiation with foreign powers . . . . There is something more 
required than responsibility in conducting treaties. The Constitu-
tion contemplates the united wisdom of the President and Sen-
ate, in order to make treaties . . . . The more wisdom there is 
employed, the greater security there is that the public business 
will be well done. 237 
There was no hint during the ratification process that the President's 
constitutional authority to receive foreign diplomats conveyed any sub-
stantive power over foreign affairs. Hamilton in Federalist No. 69 had little 
to say about the matter, other than that it spared Congress inconvenience: 
236. On foreign trade, see, e.g., THE F'EDERAUST Nos. 11 & 22 (A. Hamilton), id. No. 42 
(J. Madison); on federal revenue, e.g., id. No. 31 (A. Hamilton), id. No. 41 (J. Madison); on 
coining and valuing money, id. Nos. 42 & 44 (J. Madison); on the other powers noted in the 
text, id. No. 42 (J. Madison). 
237. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 1122-23 (1790). 
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The President is also to be authorized to receive ambassadors, 
and other public ministers. This, though it has been a rich theme 
of declamation, is more a matter of dignity than of authority. It 
is a circumstance which will be without consequence in the ad-
ministration of the Government; and it was far more convenient 
that it should be arranged in this manner, than that there should 
be a necessity of convening the Legislature, or one of its branches, 
upon every arrival of a foreign minister; though it were merely to 
take the place of a departed predecessor. m 
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Madison in No. 42 did not mention the President, while commenting on 
the reception of diplomats. 239 
The Executive's duty to take care that the laws be faithfully executed 
was thought significant. But it was not considered authority for him to 
enforce anything except congressional acts and treaties, or to use military 
force240 to implement law without explicit legislative authorization. 
238. During the ratification process some feared the appointment power as a source of 
overweening executive authority, e.g., 1 ELLIOT 379 (Martin: "the person who nominates v.ill 
always in reality appoint"); while others took the opposite tack and found it a font of danger-
ous senatorial prerogative, e.g., 4 id. at 116 (Spencer: the Senators "had a negative upon" 
the Executive's nominations, "till he has exhausted the number of those he v.ishes to be 
appointed," and is "obliged, finally, to acquiesce in the appointment of those whom the 
Senate shall nominate, or else no appointment will take place.") Still others, often to support 
argument that the Senate would not be unduly powerful, described the joint control over 
appointments in more equal terms, e.g., 2 id. at323, 476-77. Finally, there was some fa\-orable 
comment on the President's power to make interim appointments during senatorial recess, 
e.g., 2 id. at 513-14; 4 id. at 135 (Maclaine). Hamilton commented on the appointment power 
in The Federalist Nos. 65-67, 69 and 77. Though a man imbued with Executive-first notions, 
he favored in No. 77, at 419, Senate consent to the removal of officials appointed with its 
blessing. 
239. Madison wrote: 
The second class of powers, lodged in the General Government, consists of those 
which regulate the intercourse with foreign nations, to wit, to make treatie:>; to 
send and receive ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls; to define and 
punish piracies and felonies committed on the high seas, and offences against the 
Jaw of nations; to regulate foreign commerce .... 
This class of powers forms an obvious and essential branch of the Federal 
administration. If we are to be one nation in any respect, it clearly ought to ba in 
respect to other nations. 
The powers to make treaties, and to send and receive ambassadors, speak their 
own propriety. Both of them are comprised in the Articles of Confederation; \\ith 
this difference only, that the former is disembarrassed by the plan of the Con\-en-
tion of an exception, under which treaties might be substantially frustrated by 
regulations of the States; and that a power of appointing and receiving "other 
public ministers and consuls," is expressly and very properly added to the former 
provision concerning ambassadors. 
THE FEDERALIST No. 42, at 231-32. 
240. E.g., 2 ELLIOT 512-13 (Wilson). 
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The President's pardon power received more attention. It was seen by 
some as a key to executive usurpation. Luther Martin of Maryland dreaded 
authority to pardon even more than military command: 
The power given to these persons (the President and Vice-
President) over the Army, and Navy, is in truth formidable, but 
the power of Pardon is still more dangerous, as in all acts of 
Treason, the very offence on which the prosecution would possi-
bly arise, would most likely be in favour of the President's own 
power.241 
[Martin elaborated] - no treason was so likely to take place as 
that in which the President himself might be engaged - the 
attempt to assume to himself powers not given by the Constitu-
tion, and establish himself in regal authority; in which attempt 
a provision is made for him to secure from punishment the crea-
tures of his ambition .... 242 
New York wished to pull the sting from pardon by amending the Consti-
tution to condition executive clemency in treason cases on congressional 
approvai.243 Hamilton in Federalist No. 74, however, explained that the 
power was properly executive, in order to quell domestic revolt: 
[I]n seasons of insurrection or rebellion there are often critical 
moments when a well-timed offer of pardon to the insurgents . . . 
may restore the tranquility of the commonwealth, and which, if 
suffered to pass unimproved, it may never be possible afterward 
to recall. The dilatory process of convening the legislature, or one 
of its branches, for the purpose of obtaining its sanction to the 
measure would frequently be the occasion for letting slip the 
golden opportunity. 2H 
To at least one Ratifier, the limited executive authority to summon 
Congress in the event of emergency and to dismiss it, should the two houses 
be unable to agree on a date for adjournment, smacked of incipient mon-
archy.245 But none suggested that this authority might be used by Presi-
241. 3 FARRAND 158. 
242. 1 ELLIOT 378-79. Accord, e.g., 3 id. at 497 (Mason). 
243. See note 171 supra. 
244. THE FEDERALIST No. 74, at 409. During the Philadelphia Convention, however, Hamil-
ton had been willing to have the President pardon traitors only with "approbation of the 
Senate." 1 FARRAND 282. See also 4 ELLIOT 112-13 (suggestion by Iredell that pardon power 
might be beneficial during hostilities). 
245. 4 ELLIOT 310-11 (Lowndes). But Maclaine pointed out in the North Carolina conven-
tion that "Congress must meet at least once in every year," id. at 135; and Hamilton deni-
grated executive authority to summon and adjourn in The Federalist No. 77, at 422-23. 
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dents to block congressional action on war-peace issues. Similarly, none 
suggested that the provision for suspension of habeas corpus during mili-
tary emergency posed an executive threat. Rather, the general assumption 
was that only Congress could suspend habeas corpus.210 
Great emphasis fell on the national government's being one of enumer-
ated powers, wielding only authority specifically given it by the Constitu-
tion.24; In none of the President's enumerated powers did the Ratifiers find 
wide-ranging authority.248 For them: "In republican government the legis-
lative authority necessarily predominates. "zn 
Nor did the Ratifiers think that the President received an undefined, 
nonenumerated reservoir of power in the executive clause.%!<! Instead, his 
246. See, e.g., note 176 supra. 
247. See, e.g., 2 ELuOT 436 (Wilson), 533 (McKean [Pa.)); 4 id. at 179 (Iredell). As 
Madison wrote in The Federalist No. 14, at 77, national "jurisdiction is limited to certain 
enumerated objects," and he noted in No. 45, at 258: "The powers delegated by the proposed 
Constitution to the federal government are few and defined." See also id. No. 41 (J. Madison); 
Berger, The Presidential Monopoly of Foreign Relations, 71 MICH. L. REV. 1, 20·22. 27,32-33 
(1972). 
248. SeeTHE FEDERAUST Nos. 69 & 73-77 (A. Hamilton); cf. id. No. 42 (J. Madison). Quite 
to the contrary, concern ran to expansive readings by Congress of its enumerated sronts. See, 
e.g., id. Nos. 33 (A. Hamilton) & 44 (J. Madison) (necessary and proper clause); id. No. 41 
(J. Madison) (congressional power to tax to "provide for the common Defence and genenll 
welfare of the United States"). 
249. See THE FEDERAUST No. 48 (J. Madison). 
250. In The Federalist No. 77 Hamilton reached what he termed "the only remaining 
powers of the Executive." Neither they nor those previously covered involved the executive-
power clause. It went unmentioned. 
Madison, however, while defending congressional power to tax, asked: 
For what purpose could the enumeration of particular powers be inserted if these 
and all others were meant to be included in the preceding general power? Nothing 
is more natural nor common than first to use a general phrase, and then to explain 
and qualify it by a recital of particulars. 
ld. No. 41, at 230. Applying Madison's remarks to the President, the "preceding general 
power" is the executive-power clause, and the recital of explanatory and qualif)ing particu-
lars occurs in the grants to the President that appear principally in article ll, sections 2 and 
3 of the Constitution. 
Finally, it was always legislative authority- never executive- that Hamilton and Madi-
son described as plastic and aggressive. See THE FEoERAUST Nos. 48-51 (J. Madison) & 71, 
73 (A. Hamilton). As Madison wrote in The Federalist No. 48, at 274-75: 
[I]n a representative republic, where the Executive magistracy is" carefully 
limited, both in the extent and duration of its power; and where the Legislative 
power is exercised by an assembly, which is inspired by a supposed influence over 
the people, with an intrepid confidence in its own strength; • • • it is against the 
enterprising ambition of this department, that the people ought to indulge all 
their jealousy, and exhaust all their precautions. 
The Legislative department, derives a superiority in our Governments, from 
other circumstances, Its constitutional powers being at once more extensive and 
less susceptible of precise limits, it can, with the greater facility, mask under 
142 VmGINIA JouRNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAw [VoL. 15:1 
authority was compared with the limited powers of the state governors. 
James Bowdoin said in Massachusetts: 
The legislative powers of the President are precisely those of the 
governors of this state and those of New York- rather negative 
than positive powers, given with a view to secure the independ-
ence of the executive, and to preserve a uniformity in the laws 
which are committed to him to execute. The executive powers of 
the President are very similar to those of the several states, ex-
cept in those points which relate more particularly to the Union, 
and respect ambassadors, public ministers, and consuls.m 
And, as we have seen, the President's authority was often linked with the 
Senate's, not always in a manner suggesting executive parity with the 
Senators. :zs2 
Even those at the state conventions opposed to the Constitution - be-
cause, in Patrick Henry's words, "[y]our President may easily become a 
king":zs3 - did not find monarchy lurking in the executive-power clause. 
George Clinton as Cato sought to describe the President in the most regal 
terms possible, but cited only enumerated grants of authority to that end: 
military command, pardon, and appointments. The Executive, said Clin-
ton, 
is the generalissimo of the nation, and of course has the command 
and control. of the army, navy and militia; he is the general con-
servator of the peace of the union - he may pardon all offences, 
except in cases of impeachment, and [is] the principal fountain 
of all offices and employments. Will not the exercises of these 
complicated and indirect measures, the encroachments which it makes on the co-
ordinate departments .... On the other side, the Executive power being re-
strained within a narrower compass and being more simple in nature; and the 
Judiciary, being described by land-marks, still less uncertain, projects of 
usurpation by either of these departments would immediately betray and defeat 
themselves. 
Recall Gouverneur Morris' assertion in 1814 that the "legislative" not the executive "lion 
will not be entangled in the meshes of a logical net," referring to the Constitution's "unequi-
vocal provisions and limitations." Note 14 supra. Twenty-seven years earlier, during the 
Philadelphia Convention, Morris had warned that "The Legislature will continually seek to 
aggrandize and perpetuate themselves; and will seize those critical moments produced by 
war, invasion, or convulsion for that purpose." 2 FARRAND 52. Significantly for Hamilton, the 
Executive's veto power existed above all else to provide him with a shield against congres-
sional usurpation. THE FEDERALIST No. 73. 
251. 2 ELLIOT 128. 
252. See, e.g., text at notes 216-19 supra. 
253. 3 ELLIOT 58. See also 1 id. at 377-80 (Martin); 4 id. at 496-97 (Webster). 
1974] WAR PowERS ALLoCATION 
powers therefore tend either to establishment of a vile and arbi· 
trary aristocracy or monarchy?2l' 
143 
Certainly the friends of the Constitution did not speak of reservoirs of 
nonenumerated authority in the executive· power clause. A measure of the 
federalists' restrained accounts of presidential authority may be dis· 
counted as ratification strategy. Doubtless, some of them privately in· 
tended much more for the Executive. But what the Ratifiers actually said 
during the ratification process provides the most authoritative guide to 
their understanding of the document. And that evidence shows a stringent 
reading of the President's enumerated grants of authority and no intent to 
give him nonenumerated powers. 
v. RESUME 
What conclusions can be drawn from our overview of context, the Phila· 
delphia debates and ratification process, and from a taste of contempora· 
neous construction? 
American war·peace interests in 1787-88 were those of a small, divided 
people fearful of federal tyranny, domestic rebellion, and foreign invasion. 
The Framers and Ratifiers were more concerned with safeguards against 
military usurpation at home than with military preparedness during 
peace. Greatly more than we, they valued state authority over national, 
legislative power over executive. They preferred peace and political isola· 
tion to a world made safe for America. The institutional confidences of 
1787-88 reflected these values and needs - a small, elite branch of 
Congress was planned as a plenary participant with the President in what 
little American diplomacy was expected. State militia were to be the back· 
bone of national defense; Congress the arbiter of military policy, by govern· 
ing the existence of American armed forces and their commitment to con· 
fiict. The states and President would serve as interim defenders against 
sudden attack, pending opportunity for congressional decision - the Exec· 
utive as first general and admiral should the legislators choose to fight. 
The Framers and Ratifiers did intend a more effective national execu· 
tive, influenced by their understanding of European practice and political 
theory, by prior legislative excesses in America and by the dismal execu· 
tive record of Revolutionary and Confederation Congresses. They wanted 
presidential aid in conducting negotiations, gathering intelligence and in 
framing recommendations essential to policy·making. They hoped to ob-
tain an executive check on foolish or venal legislatQrs, and they sought 
presidential execution of national policy. But with rare exception, the 
Framers and Ratifiers did not mean to surrender legislative control over 
254. Cato IV in EssAYS ON THE CoNsmunON or THE Ul\'ITED STATES 262-63 (P. Forded. 
1892). 
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setting American policy and providing tools for its implementation. Thus, 
they rejected executive hegemony over foreign and military affairs, as seen 
in European practice and political theory. Their model, rather, was Parlia-
ment's seventeenth century steps to curb the British king, and throughout 
their debates ran a persistent fear of executive despotism. 
So far as the use of force was concerned, the Constitutional Fathers 
focused on raising, organizing, and supporting the armed forces and on 
combat. Raising, organizing, and supporting were primarily grist for state-
federal conflict, but they also helped to rebut fears of executive usurpation. 
Concern that the President might turn the military to illegal ends was 
answered by assurance that Congress alone controlled its life's blood. 
By the same token, the debates are full of assertions that the legislators 
control decisions to commit the United States to battle. It appears that the 
Constitutional Fathers meant for the country to be able to use armed force 
without a declaration of war, but not without prior authorization by major-
ity vote of the House and Senate, unless America were attacked during 
legislative recess. It appears also that they meant for the country to be able 
to use armed force on a limited, highly selective basis, as well as for unre-
stricted, general hostilities. 
The word "declare" was loosely employed by the Framers in ways equat-
ing it with "begin" or "authorize." The Constitutional Fathers, further, 
were aware that most eighteenth century conflicts had not been formally 
declared, and that political theorists distinguished between general and 
limited conflict - between "perfect" and "imperfect" war- with marque 
and reprisal a means of waging the latter. Defensive or retaliatory uses of 
force, the only sorts expected for America by the men of 1787-88, tended 
in that era to be limited, undeclared engagements. Thus, the Framers and 
Ratifiers' allocation of authority to Congress to declare war and grant 
letters of marque and reprisal almost certainly carried control over all 
involvement of American forces in combat, except in response to sudden 
attack. 
As regards the latter, the Framers apparently expected the states to bear 
the major burden of defense, until Congress could act. The Constitution 
authorizes the states to "engage in War" without prior congressional au-
thorization if they are attacked or in "such imminent Danger as will not 
admit of delay." To "engage in War" while only in imminent danger sug-
gests power to take steps preparatory to combat, such as deployment, and 
to launch preemptive strikes to forestall or blunt impending assault. 
The only equivalent authority for the President must be scavanged out 
of a brief, confused Philadelphia debate - less than two pages in Madi-
son's notes - which ended with the substitution of "declare" for "make" 
war. As we saw in detail, the discussion meandered and the nature of 
crucial votes remains obscure. Changing "make" to "declare" could not 
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have signaled much gain in executive prerogative in the minds of the 
Constitutional Fathers, however George Mason with his presidential phob-
ias voted for the substitution, and the change later went through the ratifi-
cation controversies unmentioned by the most rabid foes of the Executive. 
The possibility exists that the substitution was simply meant to prevent 
Congress from asserting control over the conduct, as well as the authoriza-
tion, of conflict. Even if, as seems more probable, the change was intended 
to authorize emergency military action by the President, no mention was 
made of his defense against imminent attack. Most happily viewed for 
presidential prerogative, then, the Framers meant make-to-declare to per-
mit executive response to ongoing physical attack on American territory 
- conceivably, also, preemptive strikes by the President against impend-
ing attack - until Congress could decide what further steps should be 
taken. 
The commander-in-chief clause, in turn, received short shrift from the 
Constitutional Fathers. It was viewed as a modest grant of authority. Ham-
ilton's "first general and admiral" interpretation reflected the consensus. 
During hostilities, the President would set strategy and tactics, and his 
authority would inevitably grow during military crisis. But he would not 
initiate American involvement in hostilities except by signing authorizing 
legislation; and he would not make peace except as a participant with the 
Senate in the treaty process. 
Those who fought the commander-in-chief clause did so for fear the 
President would turn the army to treason and usurp authority not legally 
his. The Federalists replied with the need for single command during war, 
a lesson of the Revolution, and with the danger of placing it in an ambi-
tious general rather than a civil officer with a fixed four-year tenure. They 
said that only the rare President would personally command the troops, 
and that there would be no armies, navies or militia for him to lead unless 
Congress so provided. 
Against this background, it is probable that had the Framers and Rati-
fiers dealt explicitly with uses of the military other than for combat, they 
would have assigned control over deploying and stationing troops abroad, 
arming merchant men, convoying and so on to the legislative process, 
except when these uses were incident to the conduct of an authorized 
conflict. Several factors suggest this: the extensive military powers specifi-
cally given Congress, the definition of state war powers in the legislative 
article, the provision there for suspension of habeas corpus during invasion 
or rebellion, and the Ratifiers' understanding that suspension of habeas 
would be at legislative, not executive, instance. Finally, it seems clear that 
the declare-war and commander-in-chief clauses passed with little debate 
because they left Congress with authority over how the American military 
would be used. Other than the President's participation in legislating mill-
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tary policy, his only role was to execute it. 
The Framers and Ratifiers talked very little about control over the range 
of non-military action having war and peace consequences. They simply 
gave Congress authority over the bulk of such action when it was treated 
specifically in the Constitution. Debates concerned with state-federal au-
thority indicated an awareness that congressional decisions about foreign 
commerce, in particular, would bear squarely on. the country's foreign 
relations. 
Had the Framers and Ratifiers moved to fill the constitutional gaps 
peppering non-military action- for example, concerning recognition and 
neutrality - they very likely would have given control either to the legisla-
tive process or to the President and Senate together. Congress received 
specific authority over those matters which the Framers thought would be 
important to American war and peace, except for the pardon power, treaty-
making and diplomatic appointments. The Senate held sole responsibility 
over treaties and ambassadors until the last two weeks of the Philadelphia 
Convention, when the President was quickly associated in their control. 
Strong evidence exists that the Constitutional Fathers expected the Sen-
ate, no less than the President, to govern those aspects of American foreign 
relations not committed to Congress as a whole. Thus, the Executive's 
capacity to receive foreign diplomats was ignored during the Philadelphia 
debates and dismissed as insignificant during the ratification process, and 
there was no suggestion that "the executive power" of Article I, Section 1, 
conveyed authority over anything, other than enumerated prerogatives. 
Finally, Philadelphia debate on international agreements- viewed as 
the core stuff of foreign relations - spent little time on senatorial-
executive relations, and all of that on an effort to limit the President's say 
in peace treaties. During discussion of treaties, the Framers and Ratifiers 
confidently assumed that the Senate, though not the House, would be able 
to participate in transacting the country's diplomatic business. They ex-
pected it to do so. True, with foreign communications as with treaties, the 
President's unique advantages of speed and secrecy were recognized, even 
as against the Senate. But only Hamilton implied that for these reasons 
the President alone controlled even the channels of American exchange 
with other nations. 
There was a war-peace consensus in 1787-88, one very chary of executive 
power. It has just been summarized. But that consensus rested in no small 
measure on transient assumptions about American external relations and 
on faulty confidence in the Senate and militia. Further, that consensus was 
reached without much thought while the Constitutional Fathers attended 
to more pressing problems. Thought began in depth only after ratification, 
when international and institutional realities pressed home on the new 
government. 
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The real enigma of the Framers and Ratifiers' intentions, accordingly, 
is what they would have said had they seriously focused on the allocation 
of war-peace authority between the President and Congress, and done so 
with a less ephemeral set of perceptions. The United States did not enter 
an era of peace amid non-involvement with the rest of the world. The 
Senate proved inadequate from the outset as a presidential consort in 
foreign affairs. The militia was early rejected as a compleat alternative to 
standing armies and navies. Further, the President's institutional advan-
tages - his unity, continuity, and command over federal personnel -
proved compelling during the recurrent international crises of the late 
1700's and early 1800's. The early Executives moved into areas left vague 
by the Constitution, indeed into areas that the Framers and Ratifiers seem 
clearly to have intended for the President and Senate together. Signifi-
cantly, the first generation under the Constitution - including many of 
its Framers and Ratifiers - did not find these developments unsettling. 
They were prone to interpret the document's text in light of experience, 
without much concern for the specifics of 1787-88 debates. 
